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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC PRICING WITH VARIABLE ORDER SIZES
FOR A MODEL WITH CONSTANT DEMAND ELASTICITY
by
Nyles Breecher
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018
Under the Supervision of Professor Richard H. Stockbridge
We investigate a dynamic pricing model under constant demand elasticity which accounts
for customers ordering multiple items at once. A closed form expression for the optimal
expected revenue and pricing strategy is found. Models with the same demand are shown
to have asymptotically similar expected revenue and pricing strategies, even if the order
size distributions of the customers are different. Surprisingly, the relative difference between
comparable models is shown to be independent of time and the magnitude of demand.
Variations of the model are considered, including different low inventory behavior as well as
the effect of advertising. Some numerical simulations are presented to provide better insight
on the model.
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1.
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Dynamic pricing concerns sellers who attempt to maximize their profits by adjusting prices
over time. The company develops a rule, or pricing strategy, which takes into account
market conditions. Take as example the airline industry, where ticket prices are frequently
updated based on factors like how much time is left until a flight and how many seats have
already been sold. There are many other factors that could influence pricing, although this
dissertation focuses on limited time to sell and limited inventory, as these two factors are
enough to create interesting models. Some other industries which care deeply about these
factors include event ticket sales, fashion, and hotels.
By setting prices, sellers influence the demand for their goods, and more importantly,
the amount of revenue they earn. In order to maximize this revenue, a model is needed
for sales. Customer arrivals are stochastic and independent of one another, so a Poisson
based process is the natural choice for this model. The arrivals are also dependent on the
price p and time t. Thus we let λ(p, t) be the intensity of the Poisson based process to
reflect these dependencies. We will focus on the case of constant demand elasticity, which
necessitates λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε, where ε is the demand elasticity and a(t) is an arrival rate
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scale factor. Demand elasticity is a measure of how much the relative change in quantity
demanded changes with respect to a relative change in price. It is an important measure in
economics to understand how prices affect sales and helps indicate if items are necessities or
luxuries.
Optimal prices are found numerically in many contexts by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations; however, this equation can be difficult to solve in general. The
setting of constant demand elasticity offers a tractable example with analytic results, which
then lead to deeper insights on the problem itself. This setting has been explored by (McAfee
and te Velde 2008) and expanded upon by (Helmes and Schlosser 2013). Compared to these
previous works, the key difference for our work is that customers can order multiple items at
a time. In terms of the model, that means a compound Poisson process is used instead of a
regular Poisson process. To distinguish between these ideas, the compound Poisson setting
will be referred to as “variable order sizes,” while the regular Poisson setting will be referred
to as “unit order sizes.”
We now outline the structure of this dissertation. Section 1.2 provides a literature review,
and highlights papers related to various aspects of our model. Section 1.3 explains the
dynamic programming formulation which is used to determine optimal prices. Here, the
formulation is presented in a general context and is not tied to constant demand elasticity.
In Chapter 2 we focus on the basic model of constant demand elasticity and variable order
sizes, and this section contains the heart of our results. We find closed form expressions for
the optimal expected revenue and pricing strategy. A key insight is that this term involved
the average order size µ, which is not observed under the unit order case where µ = 1.
In Section 2.2, we turn to comparing constant elasticity models which have the same
demand (average rate of sales over time), yet different order size distributions, calling such
models comparable. Under constant demand elasticity, we show that as the size of the
inventory tends to ∞, comparable models have asymptotically equivalent optimal expected
revenue and optimal pricing strategies. This means, that to some degree, unit order models
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may be used to approximate variable order models. For low inventory, these differences
can be quite large from a revenue management standpoint. Section 2.3 provides numerical
results to greater analyze aspects like the convergence rate. We also show the surprising
result that the relative difference between comparable models is independent of both time
and magnitude of demand; the relative difference is completely determined by the inventory
level and the two order size distributions between the comparable models.
Chapter 3 discusses important extensions to the basic problem, which improve the flexi-
bility of the model. Section 3.1 discusses the idea of overselling, like an airline overbooking
their seats. Determining how to handle low inventory is a problem which must be addressed
for variable order sizes, and this section presents a general method for handling these cases.
Section 3.2 confirms the result of the unit order case that the monopolist pricing scheme
is socially efficient. Section 3.3 introduces advertising and other factors, such as subsidies,
into the model. This translates to more involved formulas, but does not fundamentally alter
any methods used for the basic model. Lastly, Section 3.4 examines how variable order sizes
affect the optimal pricing problem for exponential and linear customer arrival rates.
Lastly, an Appendix includes the Mathematica code which was used in the numerical
parts of the dissertation. In particular, functions are provided which can numerically com-
pute optimal expected pricing strategies and revenue for any type of customer arrival rate
function. These algorithms may be helpful to anyone wishing to do any further work on the
subject of variable order sizes.
1.2 Literature Review
Our work is most closely related to that of (McAfee and te Velde 2008) and (Helmes and
Schlosser 2013), who both explore the problem of optimal pricing in continuous time with con-
stant demand elasticity. (McAfee and te Velde 2008) explored the basic model and (Helmes
and Schlosser 2013) expanded on their work by including advertising and other factors like
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discounts and subsidies. In both papers, analytic formulas for the optimal pricing strategy
are found. These papers also discuss monopolist pricing strategies. With no advertising, a
monopolist’s pricing is shown to be efficient, and with advertising a parameter adjustment
(like a subsidy) can also ensure this. These papers also show that, in general, waiting as a
customer is not a beneficial strategy.
A key feature of these papers and our study is that the specific arrival rate λ(p, t) =
a(t)p−ε allows for analytic solutions to be found. Indeed, finding analytic solutions for
general λ is difficult primarily because λ may be complicated in general, and even if λ is
known, there is not a general analytic solution technique which can be applied in all cases.
At the very least, for λ(p, t) = e−p, an analytic solution for the optimal pricing strategy
is shown. This was shown in the seminal paper (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994), which is a
widely cited article that created general theory and foundations for dynamic pricing with
Poisson models. A wider overview of dynamic pricing models is provided by (Talluri and van
Ryzin 2004). This book also contains useful applications of dynamic pricing in the context
of specific industries.
The paper by (Monahan, Petruzzi, and Zhao 2004) also considers a dynamic pricing model
with constant demand elasticity; however, their model evolves in discrete time. Under the
discrete setup, what matters is how many items are sold per time period. This shifts the focus
away from customer arrivals, making it significantly different relative to the considerations
in our study. (Chung and Flynn 2011) expands upon the discrete time model by introducing
holding costs.
At this point we make a note about terminology in the literature. “Demand” is often
used interchangeably to refer to the customer arrival rate λ and the rate of sales λµ, where
µ is the average order size. This is not a problem for unit order sizes, where µ = 1 and so
demand and the arrival rate are equal; however, it is important to retain this distinction
when working with variable order sizes. We have elected to refer to our model as a “variable
order size” model to keep the focus on the behavior of customers. Similar generalizations
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have been made in other contexts and are sometimes referred to as “batch demand,” “random
order rates,” or “compound Poisson demand.” See (Lin, Lu, and Yao 2008), (Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak 2008), and (Xu, Yao, and Zheng 2011) for some examples. It is worth noting
that in these scenarios when variable order sizes are applied, generally only numerical results
are obtained.
Variable order size models also have connections with multiproduct dynamic pricing
models. (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997) provides a good reference for this model, and the
later paper (Maglaras and Meissner 2006) expands upon their model. Both models consider
multiple products which require the same resource. An interesting observation from these
papers, although treated briefly, is that a variable order size model can be made equivalent
to a multiproduct model by considering each order size level as a different type of product.
This similarity is not completely surprising when comparing the optimization equations used:
both have a similar form due to a summation term required to handle different types of sales.
For the classical models in operations research, the probability distribution of customer
order sizes is unaffected by the price. This is a reasonable assumption for industries like
airlines or hotels, where a group’s size is essentially fixed before they make a purchase.
Therefore, changes in price do not affect the distribution of the number of items purchased.
In other scenarios, this assumption may not hold. For example, a particularly good deal
on food is likely to induce people to buy more items at a time than they normally would.
Discounts for bulk purchasing is also a very common pricing strategy. This practice is called
nonlinear pricing, see (Wilson 1993).
The next section shows that low inventory behavior must be addressed to work with a
variable order size problem. One approach to handling low inventory is to allow overselling
or overbooking. For example, an airline can sell more seats than are actually available on a
flight. This is a common practice in the airline industries, as overbooking is a great way for
companies to earn extra revenue in spite of cancellations or no sales. Empty spaces on flights
essentially represent lost revenue. Of course, overbooking needs to be balanced with the risk
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of having too many people for a flight, in which case the airline can offer compensation in the
form of upgraded seats or flight discounts. There are many papers which explore the topic
of overbooking, see (Kunnumkal and Topaloglu 2009) and (Bertsimas and Popescu 2003) for
a couple.
1.3 Dynamic Programming Formulation
We formulate the basic version of the problem. Later, in Chapter 3 we examine extensions.
A seller has n items to sell over the time period [0, T ], with maximum time 0 < T < ∞.
Items have no value after the sales period. The customer arrival rate λ(p, t) is assumed to
be known and depends on price p ≥ 0 and time 0 ≤ t ≤ T . In practice, λ is obtained either
from vast amounts of historical data, or more recent data that sellers have gathered. The
seller wants to determine the optimal price to use for every time and inventory level which
maximizes their total expected revenue. This is known as a pricing strategy.
For now, the specific form of λ(p, t) is unspecified, as the general model formulation does
not depend on the specific λ. Customer arrivals are modeled by a random time change of
a compound Poisson process with intensity λ(p, t). Random time change refers to the fact
that price p is stochastic in time, as p is set by the seller and will be adjusted based on
the specific realization of the process. When a customer arrives, the number of items they
order is governed by a probability distribution q = (q1, . . . , qM), where qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , is
the probability that the customer orders i items and M is the maximum order size (which
can be arbitrarily large, if desired). q is assumed to not depend on price, meaning we are
focused on models for industries like airlines and hotels where groups tend to stay together.
Let vn(t;q, λ) be the optimal expected revenue with n items to sell, at current time
0 ≤ t ≤ T , under customer order size distribution q and customer arrival function λ. The
terms q and λ are after a semicolon to indicate that these features are part of the model
setup. Such notation will be useful for comparing models in the future.
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The optimal expected revenue has natural boundary conditions: vn(T ;q, λ) = 0 (time
for selling is done) and v0(t;q, λ) = 0 (no inventory left to sell). One can write a formula for
vn(t;q, λ) by using dynamic programming, also known as the Principle of Optimality. The
principle states that a problem can be divided into several subproblems: at any moment
make an optimal choice, and then proceed optimally from that point on.
Formally, let δt > 0 be a small time interval. Since the sales process is Poisson based,
0 < i ≤ M items are sold with probability qiλ(p, t)δt over the period δt, with a profit of ip
earned. 0 items are sold with probability 1 − λ(p, t)δt. In either case, to find an optimal
policy, we then proceed optimally with the new inventory and at the new time. Thus the
Principle of Optimality states
vn(t;q, λ) = sup
p
(1− λ(p, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q, λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling no items
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt(ip+ vn−i(t+ δt;q, λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling i items for p each
 . (1.3.1)
Next, we heuristically derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. More details to val-
idate the heuristic derivation of (1.3.2) are provided for more general counting processes
in (Bremaud 1981). We rearrange (1.3.1) so that the left hand side is (vn(t + δt;q, λ) −
vn(t;q, λ))/δt and then take the limit of the equation as δt→ 0 to get:
v′n(t;q, λ) =− sup
p
λ(p, t)
[
−vn(t;q, λ) +
M∑
i=1
qi(ip+ vn−i(t;q, λ))
]
.
= − sup
p
λ(p, t)
[
µ(q)p−
(
vn(t;q, λ)−
M∑
i=1
qivn−i(t;q, λ)
)]
, (1.3.2)
where µ(q) :=
∑M
i=1 qii is the average order size of the order size distribution q. The Principle
of Optimality states that a pricing policy pn(t) which satisfies the supremum in (1.3.2) for
all valid inventory n > 0 and time 0 ≤ t < T is an optimal pricing policy.
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The recursive elements in (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) show that M base case terms of vn are
needed for these equations to be well defined. The simplest choice is to define vn(t;q, λ) = 0
for n < 0. Under this assumption, (1.3.1) models overselling with no penalty costs, since
items can be sold to go into negative inventory. The practice of overselling actually common
in the airline industry, where some passengers are expected to miss their flights. Of course,
there is a risk to do so, as a plane might be overfull and compensation needs to be given out.
Without penalty costs, the current behavior of the model may feel a bit limited. We
note that the results in Chapter 2 are primarily recursive in nature, so the behavior at low
inventory often plays an unimportant role, as the eventually recursion drives the results.
This will formally be explored in Section 3.1. So for now we will assume vn(q;q, λ) = 0 when
n < 0 for ease of exposition.
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2.
Main Results
In this chapter, constant demand elasticity ε is now assumed. As will be shown, this property
requires that λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε. This chapter has three parts. Section 2.1 proves a closed
form solution for the optimal expected revenue. Its asymptotic behavior is then analyzed,
the results of which are used in Section 2.2, which focuses on comparable models. These are
models with the same demand, but different order size distributions. Comparable models
are found to have the same asymptotic behavior in the inventory size. A surprising result
is that the relative difference between comparable models does not depend on time or the
magnitude of demand. Finally, Section 2.3 shows some numerical calculations in order to
obtain a better understanding of the model as a whole.
2.1 Analytic Results for the Basic Model
Demand Q is the rate of item sales, which is calculated by multiplying the rate of customer
arrivals λ(p, t) by a customer’s average order size µ, that is Q(p, t) := λ(p, t)µ(q). Demand
elasticity ε measures how sensitive that demand is to price fluctuations. ε is a measure of the
relative change in demand compared the relative change in price, taken in absolute value,
thus
ε :=
∣∣∣∣dQ/Qdp/p
∣∣∣∣ = −p (dQ/dp)Q = −p (dλ/dp)λ . (2.1.1)
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Note that the evaluation of the absolute value is justified because for all practical purposes,
quantity demanded and price are inversely proportional, making (dQ/Q)/(dp/p) ≤ 0. Since
constant ε is assumed, (2.1.1) can be solved for λ through separation of variables. This yields
λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε for some time-dependent function a(t) > 0, which is an arrival rate scaling
factor. An interesting feature of this arrival rate λ form is that it can be made arbitrarily
large by taking p→ 0, thus ensuring all inventory can always be sold.
For this chapter, λ is always of the form a(t)p−ε, so write vn(t;q) = vn(t;q, λ) for clarity.
Substituting λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε into (1.3.2) yields
v′n(t;q) = − sup
p
a(t)p−ε
[
−vn(t;q) +
M∑
i=1
qi(ip+ vn−i(t;q))
]
= − sup
p
a(t)p−ε
[
µ(q)p−
(
vn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qivn−i(t;q)
)]
. (2.1.2)
Using standard calculus, the price p∗ which attains the supremum in (2.1.2) is found to be
p∗n(t;q) =
ε
ε− 1µ(q)
−1
(
vn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qivn−i(t;q)
)
. (2.1.3)
An immediate consequence of this formula is that ε > 1, since the solutions for ε ≤ 1 would
make no practical sense. From an economic standpoint this also makes sense, since goods
with ε ≤ 1 are not considered elastic goods. That means that price has little influence on
their demand, meaning that dynamic pricing is of little use. With pricing strategy (2.1.3),
v′n(t;q) = −a(t)µ(q)ε
(ε− 1)ε−1
εε
(
vn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qivn−i(t;q)
)1−ε
. (2.1.4)
Before proceeding, some notation is needed. Their meaning and usefulness will become
more apparent through the proofs. Let A(t) :=
∫ T
t
a(s)ds, which can be thought of as the
expected number of future customer arrivals at a price of 1. Also let (βn(q))n be the sequence
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given by βn(q) = 0 for n ≤ 0 and such that for n > 0, βn(q) is the non-negative solution to
ε− 1
ε
= βn(q)
1
ε−1
(
βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)
)
. (2.1.5)
Equation (2.1.5) will be helpful because it mirrors some structure in (2.1.4). Note that
analytically finding βn(q) would be cumbersome if not impossible, but can be computed
numerically rather simply. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to (2.1.5) is given by
the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1.1. Let fb,c(x) := x
1
ε−1 (bx− c) = bx εε−1 − cx 1ε−1 for any constants b > 0 and c.
Then there exists a unique positive solution to fb,c(x) = ε−1ε .
Proof. Let b > 0 and c be constants. Then fb,c(x) < 0 for 0 < x < c/b, fb,c(x) = 0 at
x = c/b, and fb,c(x) > 0 and increasing for x > c/b. Therefore fb,c(x) = ε−1ε has a unique
positive solution.
The lemma applies to (2.1.5) because when computing βn+1(q), all previous βi(q) for
i < n+ 1 are known. Therefore we can think of (2.1.5) as the equation ε−1
ε
= fb,c(βn+1(q)),
where b = 1 and c =
∑M
i=1 qiβn−i(q). The lemma is simple, but will be a useful reference
in Section 3.1, where new types of sequences like βn(q) are examined. Now we present the
optimal pricing policy.
Theorem 2.1.2. With arrival rate λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε and customer order sizes q, the optimal
expected revenue is
vn(t; q) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε. (2.1.6)
Furthermore, the optimal pricing strategy is
p∗n(t; q) = βn(q)
−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε.
These two equations hold for all integer inventory levels n, and for all times 0 ≤ t < T .
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Proof. Proceed by induction to show (2.1.6) holds. For n ≤ 0, by definition, βn(q) = 0 and
vn(t;q) = 0, showing that (2.1.6) holds. Recall Equation (2.1.4),
v′n+1(t;q) = −a(t)µ(q)ε
(ε− 1)ε−1
εε
(
vn+1(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qivn+1−i(t;q))
)1−ε
. (2.1.7)
This is an ordinary differential equation, so verifying that the induction hypothesis holds
for this equation will complete the induction. Note that throughout this proof t and q
dependencies are often suppressed for readability. Assume Equation (2.1.6) holds up to n.
Then (2.1.7) becomes
v′n+1 = −aµε
(ε− 1)ε−1
εε
(
vn+1 −
M∑
i=1
qiµβn+1−iA1/ε
)1−ε
. (2.1.8)
To prove that the induction assumption holds for n + 1, we substitute the induction as-
sumption for n + 1 into (2.1.8) and show that the equality remains true. Substituting the
induction assumption for n+ 1 into the left-hand side of (2.1.8) yields
v′n+1 = µβn+1
1
ε
A(1/ε)−1
dA
dt
= −aµ
ε
A(1−ε)/εβn+1.
Substituting the induction assumption (2.1.6) into the right-hand side of (2.1.8) gives
− aµε (ε− 1)
ε−1
εε
(
µβn+1A
1/ε −
M∑
i=1
qiµβn+1−iA1/ε
)1−ε
= −aµ(ε− 1)
ε−1
εε
A(1−ε)/ε
(
βn+1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn+1−i
)1−ε
= −aµA(1−ε)/ε1
ε
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε−1(
βn+1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn+1−i
)1−ε
= −aµ
ε
A(1−ε)/εβn+1,
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where the last equality is justified by the definition of βn(q), equation (2.1.5). This shows
that the left- and right-hand sides of (2.1.8) are equal for the induction assumption at n+ 1,
thus verifying the equation
vn(t;q) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε
holds for all n. Furthermore, by substituting that equation into (2.1.3) gives
p∗n(t;q) =
ε
ε− 1µ(q)
−1
(
µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε −
M∑
i=1
qiµ(q)βn−i(q)A(t)1/ε
)
= A(t)1/ε
ε
ε− 1
(
βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)
)
= A(t)1/ε
(ε− 1
ε
)ε−1(
βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)
)1−ε−1/(ε−1)
= A(t)1/εβn(q)−1/(ε−1),
finishing the proof.
Equation (2.1.6) reveals the term µ(q), which was not observed for the unit order case
shown in (McAfee and te Velde 2008), where µ = 1. The equation appears to match our
intuition that as the average order size µ(q) increases, so does our optimal expected revenue;
however, it is important to note that as q changes, so does βn(q). Therefore, more analysis
of βn(q) is necessary to truly understand (2.1.6).
Lemma 2.1.3. βn(q) is a non-decreasing sequence in n.
Proof. For n ≤ 0, βn(q) = 0. Proceed by induction and assume βk−1(q) ≤ βk(q) for all
k < n− 1. Recall (2.1.5), the recursion equation for βn(q):
ε− 1
ε
= βn(q)
1
ε−1
(
βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)
)
,
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or multiplied out as
ε− 1
ε
= βn(q)
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)βn(q)
1
ε−1 . (2.1.9)
Solving for βn(q) happens recursively. So in solving (2.1.5) for βn(q), it is assumed for any
i < n that βi(q) would be known. Thus we treat the right hand side of (2.1.9) as a function
of the variable βn(q). That is, we can think of the function
f(x) = x
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)x
1
ε−1 ,
where finding x > 0 such that ε−1
ε
= f(x) is equivalent to solving for βn(q). Similarly,
writing
g(x) = x
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβ(n−1)−i(q)x
1
ε−1
and solving for x > 0 such that ε−1
ε
= g(x) would give the value of βn−1(q). Lemma 2.1.1
shows that the positive solutions for ε−1
ε
= f(x) and ε−1
ε
= g(x) exist and are unique.
Next we show the solution to ε−1
ε
= f(x) is greater than or equal to the solution of
ε−1
ε
= g(x). Compare the coefficients of f(x) and g(x). The induction hypothesis shows
that the coefficients of f(x) are less than or equal to those in g(x). Therefore, for positive
x, f(x) ≤ g(x). Thus the positive solution to f(x) = ε−1
ε
must be greater than or equal to
the positive solution to g(x) = ε−1
ε
, or equivalently, βn(q) ≥ βn−1(q). This completes the
induction proof, proving that βn(q) is a non-decreasing sequence in n.
This lemma confirms the intuition that the optimal expected revenue vn(t;q) should
increase as the inventory n increases. For an example why βn(q) is not always strictly
increasing, consider the order size distribution q = (0, 1). That is, customers buy 1 item
with probability 0 and 2 items with probability 1. In this case, the recursion equation (2.1.5)
is the same for n = 1 and n = 2, β1(q) = β2(q). The lack of a strictly increasing property
for βn(q) is one of the reasons that analysis of βn(q) is more difficult for variable orders
compared to the unit order case.
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The next step is to look at βn(q) as n → ∞. As it turns out, βn(q) is asymptotically
equivalent to n
ε−1
ε , up to a scale factor based on µ(q). So we define γn(q) = βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
to help
simplify notation. For the unit order case, γn(q) has monotonicity and a simple upper bound
which makes finding its limit relatively straightforward. Unfortunately, when generalizing to
variable order sizes, these properties are not true for all q and so the proof of the limiting
behavior of γn(q) is more difficult. Before finding lim
n→∞
γn(q), several lemmas are needed to
help identify the asymptotic behavior of γn(q).
The first lemma contains a function whose recursive structure is similar to that of βn(q).
The asymptotic properties of this function are therefore useful in examining the asymptotic
properties of βn(q).
Lemma 2.1.4. The function
f(n; q) := n
(
1−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
n− i
n
) ε−1
ε
)
is decreasing for n > M , n ∈ R. Moreover,
lim
n→∞
f(n; q) = µ(q)
(
ε− 1
ε
)
.
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Proof. Let n > M , n ∈ R. First we show that f has a limiting value:
lim
n→∞
f(n;q) = lim
n→∞
1−∑Mi=1 qi (n−in ) ε−1ε
1/n
H
= lim
n→∞
−∑Mi=1 qi ( ε−1ε ) (n−in )−1/ε ( in2 )
−1/n2
= lim
n→∞
M∑
i=1
iqi
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
n− i
n
)−1/ε
=
M∑
i=1
iqi
(
ε− 1
ε
)
=µ(q)
(
ε− 1
ε
)
Note that f is continuous for n > M , so if f is concave up (f ′′ > 0), then f must decrease
to the limit value just shown. In other words, to show that f is decreasing for n > M , we
will show that it is concave up. Start with f ′, which is
f ′(n;q) =n
(
−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
n− i
n
)−1/ε(
i
n2
))
+
(
1−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
n− i
n
) ε−1
ε
)
=1−
M∑
i=1
qi
((
ε− 1
ε
)(
n− i
n
)−1/ε(
i
n
)
+
(
n− i
n
) ε−1
ε
)
=1−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
n− i
n
)−1/ε(
iε− i
nε
+
n− i
n
)
=1−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
n
n− i
)1/ε(
1− i
nε
)
.
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Then
f ′′(n;q) =−
M∑
i=1
qi
[(
n
n− i
)1/ε(
i
n2ε
)
+
(
1
ε
)(
n
n− i
) 1
ε
−1( −i
(n− i)2
)(
nε− i
nε
)]
=−
M∑
i=1
iqi
ε
(
n
n− i
)1/ε [
1
n2
−
(
n
n− i
)−1(
1
(n− i)2
)(
nε− i
nε
)]
=−
M∑
i=1
iqi
εn2
(
n
n− i
)1/ε [
1− nε− i
nε− iε
]
>0.
Note that the inequality is justified since ε > 1 implies that
[
1− nε−i
nε−iε
]
< 0. Thus f is
concave up, completing the proof of Lemma 2.1.4.
The next lemma gives conditional bounds for γn(q), based on properties γn(q) might
satisfy. These properties involve checking whether γn(q) is the minimum or maximum of
itself and the previous M terms in the γn sequence. It seems that, numerically, γn(q)
satisfies the given properties for large enough inventory n. That said, there are challenges
with proving this analytically for any q. Fortunately, the proof of lim
n→∞
γn(q) in Theorem
2.1.7 will sidestep this issue by considering all cases for γn(q), whether the term meets has
the given properties or not.
Lemma 2.1.5. (a) lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) > 0.
(b) If there exists a strictly increasing sequence (Nk)k ⊂ N such that
γNk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) for all k, then lim infn→∞ γn(q) ≥ µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
(c) If there exists an N ≥M such that γN(q) = max
0≤i≤M
γN−i(q), then
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ µ(q) 1−εε .
Proof. Proof of part (a): Recall γn(q) = βn(q)/n
ε−1
ε . By definition, βn(q) ≥ 0, and
therefore γn(q) ≥ 0 and lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≥ 0. Assume to the contrary that lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) = 0.
Then we can construct the decreasing subsequence (γNk(q))k of γn(q) such that N1 > M
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and the subsequence contains all γNk(q) such that γNk(q) = min
1≤i≤Nk
γi(q). In other words,
the subsequence contains all terms γn which are the smallest value seen up to that term.
This also gives that lim
k→∞
γNk(q) = 0.
Let δ > 0. Then there exists a k > 0 such that γNk(q) ≤ δ. Substitute γNk(q)N
ε−1
ε
k =
βNk(q) into (2.1.5), noting that the inequality is justified by the construction of γNk(q),
ε− 1
ε
= γNk(q)
1
ε−1Nk
(
γNk(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiγNk−i(q)
(
Nk − i
Nk
) ε−1
ε
)
≤ γNk(q)
1
ε−1Nk
(
γNk(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiγNk(q)
(
Nk − i
Nk
) ε−1
ε
)
(2.1.10)
= γNk(q)
ε
ε−1Nk
(
1−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
Nk − i
Nk
) ε−1
ε
)
=: γNk(q)
ε
ε−1f(Nk;q) (2.1.11)
By Lemma 2.1.4, f(n;q) is decreasing for n > M and therefore f(Nk;q) ≤ f(M ;q). Thus
from (2.1.11) we get
ε− 1
ε
≤ γNk(q)
ε
ε−1f(M ;q) ≤ δ εε−1f(M ;q),
but this is a contradiction since f(M ;q) is a constant while δ is arbitrary. Therefore
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) 6= 0, completing the proof of part (a).
Proof of part (b): Suppose there exists an increasing sequence (Nk)k such that N1 > M
and γNk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) for all k. Assume that (Nk)k contains every integer n > M
such that γn(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γn−i(q). First we get a bound for lim inf
k→∞
γNk(q), then we show
lim inf
k→∞
γNk(q) = lim infn→∞ γn(q).
Note that γNk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) implies that the inequality (2.1.10) holds for all k, and
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thus (2.1.11) holds for all k as well:
ε− 1
ε
≤ γNk(q)
ε
ε−1f(Nk;q),
or written another way,
γNk(q) ≥
(
ε− 1
εf(Nk;q)
) ε−1
ε
.
Let δ > 0. By Lemma 2.1.4, there exists a K ≥ M such that for all k ≥ K, f(Nk;q) ≤
µ(q)
(
ε−1
ε
)
(1 + δ) and thus
γNk(q) ≥
(
1
µ(q)(1 + δ)
) ε−1
ε
.
Therefore
lim inf
k→∞
γNk(q) ≥ lim inf
k→∞
(
1
µ(q)(1 + δ)
) ε−1
ε
=
(
1
µ(q)(1 + δ)
) ε−1
ε
,
but δ was arbitrary and so
lim inf
k→∞
γNk(q) ≥
(
1
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
With a bound established, we now show that lim inf
k→∞
γNk(q) = lim infn→∞ γn(q).
For each j ≥ N1, define aj such that Naj ≤ j < Naj+1. We claim that
γj(q) ≥ γNaj (q). (2.1.12)
To prove the claim, consider if j = Naj . Then γj(q) = γNaj (q) and the claim is true. If
j > Naj , suppose towards contradiction that γj(q) ≤ γNaj (q). Without loss of generality
assume that j is the smallest value greater than Naj such that γj(q) ≤ γNaj (q) holds. If not,
we could just find some value between Naj and j which is. Then γj(q) = min
Naj−M≤i≤j
γi(q) =
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min
0≤i≤M
γj−i(q), and so j ∈ (Nj)j. But also (Nj)j is an increasing sequence and j > Naj , so
j ≥ Naj+1. This contradicts the fact that Naj ≤ j < Naj+1. Hence γj(q) ≥ γNaj (q), proving
claim (2.1.12). This equation then shows
lim inf
j→∞
γj(q) ≥ lim inf
j→∞
γNaj (q).
Also (Nj)j is a subsequence of (Naj)j, and thus lim inf
j→∞
γNaj (q) ≥ lim infj→∞ γNj(q). Combining
everything together yields
lim inf
j→∞
γj(q) ≥ lim inf
j→∞
γNaj (q) ≥ lim infj→∞ γNj(q) ≥ µ(q)
1−ε
ε ,
completing the proof of part (b).
Proof of part (c) Assume there exists an N1 such that N1 > M and γN1(q) =
max
0≤i≤M
γN1−i(q). We follow the same development in part (a) for equation (2.1.11), except
our assumption now reverses inequality (2.1.10), thus
ε− 1
ε
≥ γN1(q)
ε
ε−1f(N1;q).
Use the fact from Lemma 2.1.4 that f is decreasing and lim
n→∞
f(n;q) = µ(q)
(
ε−1
ε
)
to get
ε− 1
ε
≥ γN1(q)
ε
ε−1µ(q)
(
ε− 1
ε
)
,
or
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≥ γN1(q).
Now suppose N2 is the smallest value greater than N1 such that γN2(q) > µ(q)
1−ε
ε . Then
γN2(q) = max
N1−M≤i≤N2
γi(q) = max
0≤i≤M
γN2−i(q). But by the same argument for N1, µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≥
γN1(q), a contradiction. Hence no such N2 exists and γn(q) ≤ µ(q)
1−ε
ε for all n > N1,
completing the proof.
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The next lemma relates lim sup γn(q) and lim inf γn(q). These relations are helpful with
the conditional bounds from Lemma 2.1.5, as we will be able to obtain equalities instead of
inequalities. This proof is the most involved proof of the dissertation, and illustrates how
variable order sizes can complicate the basic problem. In this case, the complication comes
from not being able to prove that γn(q) actually has specific properties for all n.
Lemma 2.1.6. (a)
1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≤ µ(q) lim inf
n→∞
γn(q).
(b)
1
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≥ µ(q) lim sup
n→∞
γn(q).
Proof. Proof of part (a) The idea of this proof is to start with the recursive equation
for βn(q) in (2.1.5). From there we significantly alter the look of the equation in order to
write it using the successive difference terms ∆βn(q) := βn(q) − βn−1(q). These successive
differences will prove to be useful due to the fact that they have a convenient bound which
we now show. Since the qi form a probability distribution,
∑M
i=1 qi = 1 and thus
∆βn(q) = βn(q)− βn−1(q) = βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−1(q).
Lemma 2.1.3 states that βn(q) is non-decreasing in n, thus from the previous equation we
get
∆βn(q) ≤ βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q).
Notice that the right hand side of this equation is one of the terms in the recursion equation
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for βn(q), equation (2.1.5). Thus we can substitute to get
∆βn(q) ≤
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
1
βn(q)1/(ε−1)
)
, (2.1.13)
giving a bound for ∆βn(q). Differences between non-successive βn(q) can be written as a
telescoping sum of successive differences, that is βn(q)−βn−k(q) =
∑k−1
j=0 ∆βn−j(q). This fact
is also useful for finding bounds. We now reformulate (2.1.5) by using successive differences.
Recall also that the average order size is given by µ(q) =
∑M
i=1 iqi. Equation (2.1.5) is now
reformulated:
(
ε− 1
ε
)
1
βn(q)
1
ε−1
= βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q)
=
M∑
i=1
qi(βn(q)− βn−i(q))
=
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=0
qi∆βn−j(q)
=
M∑
i=1
qi
[
∆βn(q) +
i−1∑
j=1
∆βn−j(q)
]
=
M∑
i=1
qi∆βn(q) +
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi∆βn−j(q)
=
M∑
i=1
iqi∆βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
(i− 1)qi∆βn(q) +
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi∆βn−j(q)
= µ(q)∆βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi∆βn(q) +
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi∆βn−j(q)
= µ(q)∆βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [∆βn(q)−∆βn−j(q)]
Substitute βn(q) = n
ε−1
ε γn(q) into the left hand side of the previous equation to get
(
ε− 1
ε
)
1
n
1
εγn(q)
1
ε−1
= µ(q)∆βn(q)−
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [∆βn(q)−∆βn−j(q)] . (2.1.14)
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It may look odd to have both γn(q) and β terms in the equation. Eventually (2.1.13) will
be used to eliminate any β terms from the equation, while keeping only the one γn(q) term.
Let δ > 0. Then choose Nδ large enough such that for all n ≥ Nδ.
1
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≥ 1
lim sup
k→∞
γk(q)
1
ε−1
− δ (2.1.15)
We now explain why such an Nδ exists. First note that Lemma 2.1.5(a) states that
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) > 0, and so the right hand side of (2.1.15) is not ∞. Then Nδ can be chosen
large enough to ensure that whenever γn(q) > lim sup
k→∞
γk(q), that γn(q) is close enough
lim sup
k→∞
γk(q) in order to satisfy (2.1.15). Whenever γn(q) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
γk(q), (2.1.15) is already
satisfied.
Let N > Nδ. Eventually we will take the limit as N →∞, but for now we sum equation
(2.1.14) from n = Nδ to N to obtain
N∑
n=Nδ
(
ε− 1
ε
)
1
n
1
εγn(q)
1
ε−1
=
N∑
n=Nδ
µ(q)∆βn(q)−
N∑
n=Nδ
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [∆βn(q)−∆βn−j(q)] .
Note the telescoping sum
N∑
n=Nδ
∆βn(q) = βN(q)− βNδ−1(q), making the previous equation
N∑
n=Nδ
(
ε− 1
ε
)
1
n
1
εγn(q)
1
ε−1
= µ(q)(βN(q)− βNδ−1(q))− S, (2.1.16)
where the telescoping sum also is used for writing
S =
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [(βN(q)− βNδ−1(q))− (βN−j(q)− βNδ−j−1(q))] .
Why is this new form useful? Note that ∆βN(q) = βN(q)− βN−1(q) depends on the N for
two terms. However, the telescoped sum
N∑
n=Nδ
∆βn(q) = βN(q)− βNδ−1(q) only depends on
N for one term. So as N →∞, βNδ−1(q) remains fixed while βN(q) increases.
23
Next we eliminate the summation on the left-hand side of (2.1.16). Observe the the
following sum can be thought of as a Riemann sum estimate of an integral, that is,
N∑
n=Nδ
1
n
1
ε
≥
∫ N+1
Nδ
x−1/εdx ≥
∫ N
Nδ
x−1/εdx =
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
N
ε−1
ε −N
ε−1
ε
δ
)
.
Applying the previous inequality along with (2.1.15) to equation (2.1.16) yields
(
N
ε−1
ε −N
ε−1
ε
δ
) 1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
− δ
 ≤ µ(q)(βN(q)− βNδ−1(q))− S,
and dividing by N
ε−1
ε ,
(
1−
(
Nδ
N
) ε−1
ε
) 1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
− δ
 ≤ µ(q)(γN(q)− βNδ−1(q)
N
ε−1
ε
)
− S
N
ε−1
ε
.
Now take the liminf as N →∞ to get
1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
− δ ≤ lim inf
N→∞
(
µ(q)γN(q)− S
N
ε−1
ε
)
. (2.1.17)
In order to simplify the liminf further, we now show that lim
N→∞
S
N
ε−1
ε
= 0. Begin by writing
S =
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [[βN(q)− βNδ−1(q)]− [βN−j(q)− βNδ−j−1(q)]]
=
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi [[βN(q)− βN−j(q)]− [βNδ−1(q)− βNδ−j−1(q)]]
=
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi
[
j−1∑
k=0
∆βN−k(q)− [βNδ−1(q)− βNδ−j−1(q)]
]
. (2.1.18)
Then ∣∣∣∣ S
N
ε−1
ε
∣∣∣∣ ≤ M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi
[
j−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∆βN−k(q)
N
ε−1
ε
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣βNδ−1(q)− βNδ−j−1(q)
N
ε−1
ε
∣∣∣∣
]
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Using this inequality along with with the bound (2.1.13) yields
∣∣∣∣ S
N
ε−1
ε
∣∣∣∣ ≤ M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
qi
[
j−1∑
k=0
(
ε− 1
ε
) ∣∣∣∣∣ 1βN−k(q)1/(ε−1)N ε−1ε
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣βNδ−1(q)− βNδ−j−1(q)
N
ε−1
ε
∣∣∣∣
]
Then since Nδ is fixed, the right hand side of this inequality goes to 0 as N → ∞ (recall
that Lemma 2.1.3 stated that βn(q) was non-decreasing in n). Therefore
0 = lim
N→∞
S
N
ε−1
ε
.
Thus (2.1.17) becomes
1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
− δ ≤ µ(q) lim inf
N→∞
γN(q). (2.1.19)
Since this equation is true for all δ > 0, we get
1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≤ µ(q) lim inf
n→∞
γn(q), (2.1.20)
completing the proof of part (a).
Proof of part (b) The proof of part (b) is done in a nearly identical way to part (a).
The adjustments are mostly in notation: limsup is exchanged with liminf, the inequalities
are reversed, and a +δ is needed instead of −δ. For instance, the analog of (2.1.15) is
1
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≤ 1
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
+ δ. (2.1.21)
To summarize these lemmas, Lemma 2.1.5 gives conditional bounds for γn(q) and Lemma
2.1.6 gives useful relations relating lim inf γn(q) to lim sup γn(q). We now use these results
together to prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 2.1.7. For any choice of ε > 1 and order size distribution q,
lim
n→∞
γn(q) = lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
Proof. Suppose the following claim is true (it will be proved later in the proof):
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) = lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) = lim
n→∞
γn(q). (2.1.22)
Then substituting this equation into Lemma 2.1.6(a) and Lemma 2.1.6(b) gives
1
lim
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≤ µ(q) lim
n→∞
γn(q)
1
lim
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≥ µ(q) lim
n→∞
γn(q),
meaning equality holds,
1
lim
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
= µ(q) lim
n→∞
γn(q).
Solving for the limit gives
lim
n→∞
γn(q) = µ(q)
1−ε
ε ,
which proves the theorem.
Now we prove the claim. This is accomplished by considering three cases, based on
whether the following properties hold or not:
Property 1: There exists an infinite, increasing sequence (Nk)k ⊂ N such that γNk(q) =
min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) for all k.
Property 2: There exists an N ≥M such that γN(q) = max
0≤i≤M
γN−i(q).
Note that these properties are related to the conditions present in Lemma 2.1.5.
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Proof of claim, case 1: Suppose Property 1 holds.
Then the conditions of Lemma 2.1.5(b) are met and thus
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≥ µ(q) 1−εε .
Combining this with inequality from Lemma 2.1.6(b) gives
1
(µ(q)
1−ε
ε )
1
ε−1
≥ 1
lim inf
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≥ µ(q) lim sup
n→∞
γn(q),
and simplifying µ(q) terms yields
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≥ lim sup
n→∞
γn(q).
Therefore
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≥ lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≥ µ(q) 1−εε ,
and equality holds throughout, proving claim (2.1.22) for case 1.
Proof of claim, case 2: Suppose Property 2 holds.
Then by Lemma 2.1.5(c),
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ µ(q) 1−εε .
Combining this with Lemma 2.1.6(a) we get
1
(µ(q)
1−ε
ε )
1
ε−1
≤ 1
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)
1
ε−1
≤ µ(q) lim inf
n→∞
γn(q),
and simplifying the µ(q) terms yields
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≤ lim inf
n→∞
γn(q).
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Therefore
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≤ lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ µ(q) 1−εε ,
and equality holds throughout, proving the claim for case 2.
Proof of claim, case 3: Suppose neither Properties 1 nor 2 hold. The idea of this case
is to find a sequence of upper and lower bounds for γn(q), then to show that the difference
between these upper and lower bound sequences goes to 0.
Since Property 1 is false, there exists an N1 > M such that for all n ≥ N1, γn(q) 6=
min
0≤i≤M
γn−i(q). Let (Nk)k ⊂ N be a strictly increasing sequence starting with N1 such that
for all k the condition
γNk−M(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) (2.1.23)
holds. That is, γNk−M(q) is the minimum of itself and the next M terms in the γ sequence.
Why does such a sequence exist? Suppose instead (Nk)k ⊂ N is any strictly increasing
sequence starting with N1. We can use this sequence to construct one which also satisfies
(2.1.23). Let 0 < lk ≤ M be such that γNk−lk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q). In other words, lk
is the value of i which achieves the minimum min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q). If lk = M , then condition
(2.1.23) holds for Nk. Note that lk 6= 0 since for all n > N1, γn(q) 6= min
0≤i≤M
γn−i(q). By
the same reasoning, γNk+1(q) 6= min
0≤i≤M
γNk+1−i(q), and thus γNk−lk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk+1−i(q).
Repeat this argument to see γNk−lk(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk+(M−lk)−i(q), or written another way,
γ(Nk+M−lk)−M(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γ(Nk+M−lk)−i(q). This shows condition (2.1.23) holds for Nk +
M − lk. Therefore the sequence (Nk +M − lk)k satisfies condition (2.1.23) for all k. Lastly,
(Nk+M−lk)k may not be strictly increasing, but since Nk is strictly increasing andM−lk ≥
0, a strictly increasing subsequence of (Nk+M− lk)k exists, thereby showing the appropriate
sequence exists.
We now aim to find lower and upper bounds for γn(q). For all k ≥ 1, let ak = Nk −M .
Then γak(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q) by the properties of (Nk)k. Suppose some n is the first n > ak
such that γn(q) < γak(q). Then γn(q) = min
Nk−M≤i≤n
γi(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γn−i(q). But this is a
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contradiction since all γn(q) for n > N1 lack this property. Therefore there is no n > ak
such that γn(q) < γak(q), giving for all k the lower bound
γak(q) ≤ lim infn→∞ γn(q). (2.1.24)
For all k ≥ 1, let bk be such that Nk − M < bk ≤ Nk and γbk(q) = max
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q)
(note that bk 6= Nk −M = ak, because γak(q) = min
0≤i≤M
γNk−i(q)). Suppose n is the first
n > bk such that γn(q) > γbk(q). Then γn(q) = max
Nk−M≤i≤n
γi(q) = max
0≤i≤M
γn−i(q). But
this is a contradiction since Property 2 is false. Therefore there is no n > bk such that
γn(q) > γbk(q), giving the upper bound for all k
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ γbk(q). (2.1.25)
Equations (2.1.24) and (2.1.25) together imply that
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)− lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ γbk(q)− γak(q). (2.1.26)
Thus a bound for γbk(q)− γak(q) is also a bound for lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)− lim inf
n→∞
γn(q).
To help towards finding a bound, recall equation (2.1.13) of Lemma 2.1.6:
βn(q)− βn−1(q) ≤
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
1
βn(q)1/(ε−1)
)
. (2.1.27)
Thus the following is true (notes have been added to the left-hand side in the calculation to
provide specific justification for some steps):
γbk(q)− γak(q) =
βbk(q)
b
ε−1
ε
k
− βak(q)
a
ε−1
ε
k
(ak < bk by construction) ≤ βbk(q)
b
ε−1
ε
k
− βak(q)
b
ε−1
ε
k
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=
1
b
ε−1
ε
k
(βbk(q)− βak(q))
=
1
b
ε−1
ε
k
bk∑
i=ak+1
βi(q)− βi−1(q)
(Equation (2.1.27)) ≤ 1
b
ε−1
ε
k
bk∑
i=ak+1
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
1
βi(q)1/(ε−1)
)
(Lemma 2.1.3 states βn(q) is non-decreasing) ≤ 1
b
ε−1
ε
k
bk∑
i=ak+1
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
1
βak+1(q)1/(ε−1)
)
(bk − ak ≤M by construction, ε− 1
ε
< 1) ≤ 1
b
ε−1
ε
k
(
M
βak+1(q)1/(ε−1)
)
. (2.1.28)
Now combining (2.1.26) and (2.1.28) we get, for each k,
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)− lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ γbk(q)− γak(q) ≤
1
b
ε−1
ε
k
(
M
βak+1(q)1/(ε−1)
)
. (2.1.29)
Note that bk is a sequence of increasing integers, since Nk −M < bk ≤ Nk and Nk was an
increasing sequence of integers. Also, βk(q) is at worst non-decreasing in k. So taking the
limit of (2.1.29) as k →∞ shows that
0 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
γn(q)− lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) ≤ 0,
or in other words,
lim sup
n→∞
γn(q) = lim inf
n→∞
γn(q) = lim
n→∞
γn(q),
proving the claim for case 3.
It is quite surprising that βn(q) has such a simple comparison in the limit, given that
(2.1.5), the recursion equation for βn(q), looks quite complex. Theorem 2.1.7 shows again
the importance of the average order size term µ(q), which is not observed in the unit order
case where µ(q) = 1. The term µ(q) was also seen in Theorem 2.1.2, which said that the
optimal expected revenue was given by vn(t;q) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε.
30
The limit in Theorem 2.1.2 along with the formula for vn(t;q) imply the intuitive result
that, since ε−1
ε
< 1, having more inventory has diminishing returns. Also consider from
Theorem 2.1.2 the formula for the optimal price, p∗n(t;q) = βn(q)−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε. The limit
of Theorem 2.1.2 shows that p∗ changes less and less as n → ∞. This is in line with the
idea that dynamic pricing becomes less relevant with large inventory, and will have the best
benefits for small to moderate inventory.
From a practical or numerical standpoint, the simpler term (n/µ(q))
ε−1
ε can be used
to approximate βn(q), and therefore vn(t;q) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε ≈ n ε−1ε (µ(q)A(t)) 1ε . This
approximation can be important to save computation time if n is very large or there are a
lot of order sizes. However, as the next section will show, there is very useful application of
the approximation when looking at comparable models.
2.2 Comparable Models
We now turn to the analysis of comparable models, that is, models which have the same
demand yet have different order size distributions. LetMq,λ denote a model with order size
distribution q and arrival rate λ(p, t). Define two models Mq,λ and Mq¯,λ¯ to be comparable
if their demands are equal for all p > 0 and 0 < t < T , i.e.
λ(p, t)µ(q) = λ¯(p, t)µ(q¯).
For constant demand elasticity, arrival rates are of the form λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε and λ¯(p, t) =
a¯(t)p−ε. Thus we see an equivalent condition to (2.2) is
a(t)µ(q) = a¯(t)µ(q¯). (2.2.1)
An important observation from (2.2.1) is that the arrival rate scaling factor a¯(t) is just a
scalar multiple of a(t). Observe that if Mq,λ and Mq¯,λ¯ are comparable, then so are Mq,cλ
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and Mq¯,cλ¯ for any constant c > 0. Thus, to help distinguish between these types of cases,
it is helpful to think about the term a(t)µ(q) as a demand rate scaling factor (or demand
magnitude), similar to how a(t) is the arrival rate scaling factor. The second theorem in this
chapter will examine sets of comparable models which have the same order size distributions,
but different demand magnitudes.
Since we are now considering how multiple models compare, λ can no longer be suppressed
in notation for terms like vn. For example, vn(t;q, λ) is the optimal expected revenue and
p∗n(t;q, λ) is the optimal pricing strategy for a model with order size distribution q and
customer arrival rate λ. The next result shows some interesting asymptotic behavior of the
optimal expected revenue and price for comparable models.
Theorem 2.2.1. LetMq,λ andMq¯,λ¯ be comparable models which both have constant demand
elasticity ε. Then,
lim
n→∞
vn(t; q, λ)
vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
= 1 and lim
n→∞
p∗n(t; q, λ)
p∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)
= 1.
In other words, Mq,λ and Mq¯,λ¯ have asymptotically equivalent optimal expected revenue and
pricing strategies.
Proof. LetMq,λ andMq¯,λ¯ be comparable models with λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε and λ¯(p, t) = a¯(t)p−ε.
Recall Theorem 2.1.2 which stated that vn(t;q) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t)1/ε. This was for a model
with λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε but now λ dependencies mater, so the notation of the formula must
be updated. Define A(t; a) =
∫ T
t
a(s)ds and A(t; a¯) =
∫ T
t
a¯(s)ds. Then Theorem 2.1.2 says
vn(t;q, λ) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t; a)1/ε. (2.2.2)
Also recall Theorem 2.1.7, which stated lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε . Let δ > 0. By combining
(2.2.2) with Theorem 2.1.7 we see that there exists Na > 0 such that for all n > Na,
∣∣∣∣∣vn(t;q, λ)− µ(q)
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ.
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Similarly, there exists Na¯ > 0 such that for all n > Na¯,∣∣∣∣∣vn(t; q¯, λ¯)− µ(q¯)
(
n
µ(q¯)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ.
Note that for a constant c, A(t; ca) =
∫ T
t
ca(t)dt = c
∫ T
t
a(t)dt = cA(t; a). We also have from
the condition for comparable models (2.2.1) that a(t) = a¯(t)µ(q¯)
µ(q) . Thus
µ(q)
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε = µ(q)
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
A
(
t;
a¯µ(q¯)
µ(q)
) 1
ε
= µ(q)
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
(
µ(q¯)
µ(q)
) 1
ε
A (t; a¯)
1
ε
= µ(q¯)
(
n
µ(q¯)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε .
Then for n > max(Na, Na¯),
∣∣vn(t;q, λ)− vn(t; q¯, λ¯)∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣vn(t;q, λ)− µ(q)
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣µ(q¯)
(
n
µ(q¯)
) ε−1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε − vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2δ.
Since δ was arbitrary, this proves that two comparable models have asymptotically equiv-
alent optimal expected revenues as n→∞.
Theorem 2.1.2 also gives the optimal expected revenue as p∗n(t;q) = βn(q)−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε.
We follow a similar argument as was used for vn. Let δ > 0. Then by Theorems 2.1.2 and
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2.1.7 there exists an N such that for all n > N ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣p∗n(t;q, λ)−
((
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε
)− 1
ε−1
A(t; a)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣p∗n(t;q, λ)−
(
n
µ(q)
)− 1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ∣∣∣∣∣∣p∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)−
((
n
µ(q¯)
) ε−1
ε
)− 1
ε−1
A(t; a¯)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣p∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)−
(
n
µ(q¯)
)− 1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ.
Also,
(
n
µ(q)
)− 1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε =
(
n
µ(q)
)− 1
ε
(
µ(q¯)
µ(q)
) 1
ε
A (t; a¯)
1
ε =
(
n
µ(q¯)
)− 1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε
Therefore
∣∣p∗n(t;q, λ)− p∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣p∗n(t;q, λ)−
(
n
µ(q)
)−1
ε
A(t; a)
1
ε
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
µ(q¯)
)−1
ε
A(t; a¯)
1
ε − p∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)
∣∣∣∣∣
<2δ
Hence the optimal pricing strategies for the comparable models are asymptotically equivalent
as n→∞.
Observe that given a particular model Mq,λ, we can always find a comparable model
Mq¯,λ¯ of any order size distribution q¯. Comparable models have equal demands, that is
λ(p, t)µ(q) = λ¯(p, t)µ(q¯). So set λ¯(p, t) = µ(q)/µ(q¯)λ(p, t) in order to makeMq,λ andMq¯,λ¯
comparable. In particular, by choosing q¯ = (1), a variable order size model always has a
comparable unit order size model.
Theorem 2.2.1 proves the intuitive idea that models where inventory is being sold at
similar rates will have similar behavior. The next natural question to ask is how similar
are comparable models? One measure of the difference between two comparable models is
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their relative difference. Define the relative difference of optimal expected revenue between
comparable models Mq,λ and Mq¯,λ¯ by
gn,t(Mq,λ,Mq¯,λ¯) :=
vn(t;q, λ)− vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
,
for 0 ≤ t < T and n > 0.
Theorem 2.2.2. LetMq,λ andMq¯,λ¯ be comparable models which both have constant demand
elasticity ε. For any 0 ≤ t < T and n > 0,
gn,t(Mq,λ,Mq¯λ¯) =
(
µ(q)
µ(q¯)
)(ε−1)/ε
βn(q)− βn(q¯)
βn(q¯)
.
Notably, the relative difference g does not depend on time nor the demand magnitude of the
models.
Proof. LetMq,λ andMq¯,λ¯ be comparable models with λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε and λ¯(p, t) = a¯(t)p−ε.
Since the models are comparable, (2.2.1) holds and so a(t) = a¯(t)µ(q¯)
µ(q) . Recall the optimal
expected revenue from Theorem 2.1.2, modified to include all relevant dependencies,
vn(t;q, λ) = µ(q)βn(q)A(t; a)1/ε.
Recall also that for a constant c, A(t; ca) = cA(t; a). Then
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gn,t(Mq,λ,Mq¯,λ¯) =
vn
(
t;q, λ¯µ(q¯)
µ(q)
)
− vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
vn(t; q¯, λ¯)
=
µ(q)βn(q)
(
A
(
t; a¯µ(q¯)
µ(q)
))1/ε
− µ(q¯)βn(q¯)A(t; a¯)1/ε
µ(q¯)βn(q¯)A(t; a¯)1/ε
=
µ(q)βn(q)
(
µ(q¯)
µ(q)
)1/ε
A(t; a¯)1/ε − µ(q¯)βn(q¯)A(t; a¯)1/ε
µ(q¯)βn(q¯)A(t; a¯)1/ε
=
(
µ(q)
µ(q¯)
)(ε−1)/ε
βn(q)− βn(q¯)
βn(q¯)
.
Consider two comparable models and then consider those models with their demand mag-
nitude a(t)µ(q) doubled. For the demand magnitute expression, µ(q) does not change in this
scenario, doubling demand magnitude is equivalent to doubling a(t). Theorem 2.2.2 states
that their relative difference will not change. This is surprising, since it might intuitively
feel like increased demand should lead to increased differences between the models. The key
feature which enables the proof of Theorem 2.2.2 is that the formula for the optimal expected
revenue is separable. This property allows the time terms a(t) and a¯(t) to drop out. Since
demand magnitude is given by a(t)µ(q), but in this scenario µ(q) is fixed, changing the
demand magnitude equates to changing a(t). Thus changing the demand magnitude does
not change the relative difference.
One of the main goals of this dissertation is to identify the changes generated by gen-
eralizing unit order models to variable order models. In the previous section, we saw how
analytic results changed and the new techniques needed to handle these changes. This sec-
tion provided a structure that can be used to compare models and presented results related
to these ideas. Of particular note is that variable order models have a comparable model
which only has unit orders. In the next section we will use numerical observations to get a
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more concrete idea of what variable order size models look like, especially relative to their
unit order counterparts.
2.3 Numerical Observations
This section will provide graphs from numerical calculations to help visualize the results
proven thus far in the dissertation. Note that many of the graphs will show continuous plots
even though the graphs are technically discrete plots. This makes the graphs easier to parse.
Additionally, all of the the code used in this section is presented in the appendix.
We begin with Theorem 2.1.7, which stated that
lim
n→∞
γn(q) = lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
One of the crucial observations from this result is that
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε is an approximation for
βn(q), a fact seen in Theorem 2.2.1. In a practical context, such an approximation would
be useful in the case where βn(q) may be slow to compute. Such might be the case if
dynamic prices are needed frequently. Thus having an idea of how quickly βn(q) converges
to
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε is useful.
An algorithm in Mathematica was created to numerically calculate βn(q). Figure 2.1 uses
the algorithm to compute βn(q) and then compare convergence of βn(q) and (n/µ(q))
ε−1
ε
for four different order size distributions. Note that for these distributions, full weight was
not put on qM because then the graph shows multiple lines per distribution and is hard to
interpret. This is due to βn(q) only changing every M terms if qM = 1.
Models with larger µ(q) appear to have slower convergence rates. We observe from
the graph that order size distributions with larger µ(q) converge more slowly. That said,
convergence is within 1% by n = 250, even for the distribution with the highest µ. This
appears like relatively quick convergence considering large aircraft can easily carry over 500
passengers and concert venues often have thousands of seats.
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Figure 2.1: Relative difference between βn(q) and (n/µ(q))
ε−1
ε and for several order size
distributions q.
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Figure 2.2 shows similarly quick convergence for the optimal expected revenue for a
variable order model to its comparable unit order model. This is an important comparison
to consider because it indicates the numerical differences between variable order and unit
order models. Again, larger average order sizes lead to slower convergence. In this graph
we observe that there appears to be more noise for low inventory. This is due to overselling,
which allows variable order models to have higher potential revenue at low inventory. Once
the inventory size gets large enough, this benefit is largely mitigated. This is one of the
reasons why we have waited to address alternative low inventory behavior until Section 3.1.
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Figure 2.2: Relative difference of vn between a variable order model and its comparable unit
order model.
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Now we consider more general comparable models. The main result for comparable
models is Theorem 2.2.1, which states that the expected total revenue of comparable models
have the same asymptotic behavior in the inventory n. Figure 2.2 gave one application of
this idea by comparing the optimal expected revenue of variable order and unit order models.
But there is more to consider than just the expected value. Since the model is a compound
Poisson type process, any realization of the model will involve randomness.
To examine this randomness, a Mathematica program was created to simulate the Poisson
based process defined in section 1.3. One property of Poisson processes with intensity λ is
that over a small interval of time δt there is a λδt chance of a customer arriving. By choosing
a specific value for δt the problem is discretized, which allows the digital implementation of
the model. That said, based on testing different δt, the discretization does not need to be
super fine to obtain precise results. We choose δt to be around 0.2% of the total time scale
for our results.
In each time step, the program randomly determines if a customer arrives, based on the
arrival rate λ(p, t). Any pricing policy can be used to then update λ(p, t) for the next time
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step. At the end of the simulation, the amount of money earned from sales is recorded.
Figure 2.3 shows probability distributions of this simulated revenue. To generate each
distribution, 20,000 trials were run. Each density curve corresponds to a model which uses
a different order size distribution q; however, all models used are comparable with demand
magnitude 3. The figure confirms the intuition that as the average order size increases, so
does the variance of the revenue.
Quantifying the exact amount of variance for each density curve is tricky though. For one,
the expected revenue can never go below 0, giving a 1 sided lower limit. But also, multiple
order size distributions can have the same average order size. This idea is explored in Figure
2.4, which shows several comparable models which have the same µ(q), but different order
size distributions. Note that these models presented in that plot are all comparable to the
models used in Figure 2.3 too. Figure 2.4 reveals that the maximum order size also plays a
role in how spread the simulated revenue is.
Figure 2.3: Probability distributions of simulated revenue for comparable models while using
policy p∗n(t;q). Per distribution: trials = 20,000, n = 100, T = 30, ε = 1.5, demand
magnitude = 3.
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Figure 2.4: Probability distributions of simulated revenue for comparable models with the
same average order size while using policy p∗n(t;q). Per distribution: trials = 100,000, max
inventory = 100, T = 30, ε = 1.5, demand rate = 3.
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The observations in this section highlight interesting aspects of our problem, and the fig-
ures provide a more concrete context through which the model can be understood. Analytic
results can inform the numerical results, and vice versa. So understanding both gives better
understanding of the model. In fact, the numerical algorithms were the original indicator for
the comparison results in Section 2.3. We hope that the programs used in this section and
presented in the appendix are useful to anyone who wishes to do any future work regarding
the variable order size model.
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3.
Extensions
The previous sections have examined a model for dynamic pricing with variable order sizes
for the specific demand function λ(p) = a(t)p−ε. The variable order size model was presented
in the most basic setting in order to illustrate the main proof methods and demonstrate the
new results variable order sizes creates. In the following sections, we provide adaptations to
the basic model.
Section 3.1 discusses how to incorporate different low inventory behavior into the model.
One adaptation allows the model to account for penalties for overselling to better model real
world situations. Another adaptation lets the seller control the minimum inventory level
which they are willing to put their inventory at. This inventory level can be negative, which
even allows the seller to control how much overselling they are willing to do. Since most
of our results rely on the asymptotic nature of the problem, we are also able to show that
different low inventory behavior retains these results.
Section 3.2 explores the idea of social efficiency. This is the idea of maximizing the value
to the consumer, rather than the revenue earned. While a straightforward adaptation of our
results, social efficiency has important economic implications: a monopolist’s pricing under
constant demand elasticity is socially efficient. These ideas translate the important economic
insights presented in the papers (McAfee and te Velde 2008) to the case of variable order
sizes.
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Section 3.3 shows how to incorporate additional effects into the model. Some effects are
small, like subsidies or tax, but some are large, like advertising. This section expands upon
the work in (Helmes and Schlosser 2013). We are able to extend their results in order to
find an optimal pricing strategy for constant demand elasticity with advertising and variable
order sizes.
Section 3.4 does not assume constant demand elasticity and explores new arrival functions
λ with variable order sizes. This follows the general dynamic programming development
presented in Section 1.3. We are unable to find analytic results like we did in Section 2.1,
but we provide a Mathematica program which is able to numerically compute optimal pricing
strategies for any λ. We use it to examine two specific types of arrival rate functions: one
which is exponential and another which is linear. The numerical calculations reveal that
comparable models with these new arrival rate functions have similar asymptotic behavior,
but their relative differences are not independent of the demand magnitude.
3.1 Low Inventory Behavior
So far our model has only accounted for one specific type of behavior at low inventory:
overselling 0 toM−1 items based on how many items the last buyer purchases. This behavior
is not very realistic from a practical standpoint; however, this simpler model allowed us to
present the results in a more understandable fashion compared to a more complicated model.
By establishing the results for a simpler case, it will also be easier to see how modifications
to the basic model propagate through the results.
Any change in the model to low inventory behavior changes how much revenue is earned
from a sale. Therefore we must go back to the original optimal revenue equation, which was
developed through dynamic programming in Section 1.3. Recall (1.3.1):
vn(t;q) = sup
p
[
(1− λ(p, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q) +
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt(ip+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))
]
. (3.1.1)
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Observe that this equation demonstrates why overselling was an issue in the first place: it
is recursive with M base case terms required. The initial solution was to define vn(t;q) = 0
for n ≤ 0 . Although this choice works mathematically, it is not practical for a couple
reasons. First, the optimal expected revenue equation does not account for any expected
costs associated with overselling. We would expect there to be some risk for this practice,
for example a flight which has too many passengers show up for it requiring compensation to
be given out. Second is that there is no control over the number of items which are oversold.
The number could be anywhere from 0 to M − 1 items, based on the order size of the last
customer. These two issues are what we seek to overcome in this section.
We first discuss how to model some risk associated with overselling. Note that any costs
used are expected costs, because it is uncertain if the cost will be incurred or not. These
probabilities could be determined from sales data. The type of costs may take a couple
forms: those depending on the price of the oversold item, and those not. Price dependent
costs could include things like full or partial refunds of the ticket price. Price independent
costs could include renting a hotel for a customer who was unable to take a flight.
It is also important to observe that the potential risk is likely to increase for each extra
oversold item. Thinking about a flight, the more total tickets that are sold, the more likely
too many passengers show up to take the flight. With this in mind, let c(n, i, p) be the
expected costs of selling 0 < i ≤ M items for a price of p while at inventory level n (n can
be negative, allowing us to keep overselling items). Since price dependent expected costs
are likely to be some percentage of the sale price, we assume c depends linearly on p. Then
c(n, i, p) =
n∑
j=n−i+1
(αjp + rj), where αj and rj are such that αjp + rj denotes the expected
cost with selling one item at price p while at inventory level j (j can be negative, indicating
overselling risks).
In the dynamic programming equation, ip is the revenue earned from a sale, so we
subtract the cost from this value to account for the risks of overselling. Let vCn (t;q) denote
the optimal expected revenue while accounting for overselling costs. Then adapting (3.1.1)
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gives
vCn (t;q) = sup
p
[
(1− λ(p, t)δt)vCn (t+ δt;q)
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt
(
ip−
n∑
j=n−i+1
(αjp+ rj) + v
C
n−i(t+ δt;q)
)]
(3.1.2)
for n ≥ 0. We still define the same boundary conditions as before: vCn (t;q) = 0 for n ≤ 0 and
vCn (0;q) = 0. We now assume αj = 1 and rj = 0 for j ≤ 0. Observe that this negates any
profit from oversold items. This equates to customer buying only available inventory, even
if they want more. This choice finally gives control over the minimum inventory level–no
items are sold which would take the inventory below 0. In fact, this threshold need not be 0.
Let m be the minimum inventory level. This means that items are never sold if it it would
bring the inventory below m.
By making m negative, one controls the maximum amount of oversold items to be |m|.
With a minimum inventory level, equation (3.1.2) does not actually change. Rather, the
indices of when the equation is valid change. Equation (3.1.2) is now valid for all n > m,
with vCn (t;q) = 0 for n ≤ m, which we also now assume going forward.
This method for controlling the minimum inventory assumes that customers will buy as
much as they are able to. However, for something like ticket sales, this does not always model
costumer behavior. For example, a family would not want to buy plane tickets for only part
of their family. This provides another method through which the minimum inventory can be
controlled. In terms of the dynamic programming equation, this shifts any probability from
cases where selling past the minimum inventory level would occur and places this probability
with no sales instead. The most items which can be sold is the minimum of M and n−m,
the difference between our current inventory level n and the minimum inventory level m.
Let vGn (t;q) be the optimal expected revenue with overselling costs and where groups stay
together. By adapting (3.1.2) for vGn (t;q), it becomes
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vGn (t;q) = sup
p
[(
1− λ(p, t)δt+
M∑
i=n−m+1
qiλ(p, t)δt
)
vGn (t+ δt;q)
+
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt
(
ip−
n∑
j=n−i+1
(αjp+ rj) + v
G
n−i(t+ δt;q)
) (3.1.3)
n ≥ m. We still define the same boundary conditions as before: vGn (t;q) = 0 for n ≤ m
and vGn (0;q) = 0. Now use the dynamic programming equations (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) to
heuristically derive their HJB equations, as we did for (1.3.2). Move all terms not multiplied
by λ to the left-hand side, divide by δt, and then take the limit as δt→ 0 to get
v˙Cn (t;q) =− sup
p
λ(p, t)
[
−vCn (t;q) +
M∑
i=1
qi
(
ip−
n∑
j=n−i+1
(αjp+ rj) + v
C
n−i(t;q)
)]
=− sup
p
λ(p, t)
[
M∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
)
p
−
(
vCn (t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
vCn−i(t;q)−
n∑
j=n−i+1
rj
))]
(3.1.4)
and
v˙Gn (t;q) =− sup
p
λ(p, t)
[(
−1 +
M∑
i=n−m+1
qi
)
vGn (t;q)
+
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
ip−
n∑
j=n−i+1
(αjp+ rj) + v
G
n−i(t;q)
) .
=− sup
p
λ(p, t)
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
)
p
−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiv
G
n (t;q)−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
vGn−i(t;q)−
n∑
j=n−i+1
rj
) . (3.1.5)
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Note that the second equality is justified because
−1 +
M∑
i=n−m+1
qi = −
M∑
i=1
qi +
M∑
i=n−m+1
qi = −
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi.
For constant demand elasticity, λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε. To find the values p∗ which attain the
supremum in (3.1.4) and (3.1.5), notice the general form of these equations: − sup
p
a(t)p−ε (K1p−K2),
where K1 and K2 are independent of price. This supremum expression is maximized when
p∗ =
ε
ε− 1K
−1
1 K2 (3.1.6)
and evaluates to −a(t)Kε1 (ε−1)
ε−1
εε
K1−ε2 . Thus the HJB equations for n > m become
v˙Cn (t;q) =− a(t)
(
M∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
))ε
(ε− 1)ε−1
εε
×
(
vCn (t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
vCn−i(t;q)−
n∑
j=n−i+1
rj
))1−ε
(3.1.7)
and
v˙Gn (t;q) =− a(t)
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
)ε (ε− 1)ε−1
εε
×
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiv
G
n (t;q)−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
vGn−i(t;q)−
n∑
j=n−i+1
rj
)1−ε (3.1.8)
We place a few restrictions on the expected costs. First, assume that there exists an N
such that αn = 0 and rn = 0 for all n > N . This way, there are eventually no costs (or more
appropriately, risks) with inventory sales, and the previous equations are in harmony with
with the original dynamic programming equation (1.3.1) for large enough n. Also, we will
assume the simpler model with rj = 0 for all j. For this model we will show the optimal
pricing strategy.
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To find the closed form expression for vCn (t;q) and vGn (t;q), we need to define some
analogs of terms used with the basic model. Define modified average order size µ terms
µCn (q) :=
M∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
)
µGn (q) :=
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
(
qii−
n∑
j=n−i+1
qiαj
)
.
Note that for n ≥ N , µ(q) = µCn (q) = µGn (q).
We also define some β-like sequences. By this, we mean sequences which have the same
recursion structure as βn(q) for large enough n. Define the sequence (βCn (q))n by βCn (q) = 0
for n ≤ m and such that for n > m, βCn (q) is the non-negative solution to
ε− 1
ε
= βCn (q)
1
ε−1
(
βCn (q)−
M∑
i=1
qi
(
µCn−i(q)
µCn (q)
)
βCn−i(q)
)
.
Similarly define (βGn (q))n by βGn (q) = 0 for n ≤ m, and such that for n > m, βGn (q) is the
non-negative solution to
ε− 1
ε
= βGn (q)
1
ε−1
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiβ
G
n (q)−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
µGn−i(q)
µGn (q)
)
βCn−i(q)
 . (3.1.9)
Existence and uniqueness of the two previous β sequences follows from (2.1.1).
Corollary 3.1.1. (Of Theorem 2.1.2) Assume constant demand elasticity ε and a model
with order size distribution q. For all t ≥ 0 and n, the optimal expected revenue for two
different low inventory behaviors is given by
vCn (t; q) = µ
C
n (q)β
C
n (q)A(t)
1/ε, vGn (t; q) = µ
G
n (q)β
G
n (q)A(t)
1/ε,
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with optimal pricing strategies
pC∗n (t; q) = β
C
n (q)
−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε, pG∗n (t; q) = β
G
n (q)
−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε.
Proof. The proof follows the same technique as that of Theorem 2.1.2. The main aspect we
wish to highlight is how the new coefficients in the equations for βCn (t;q) and βGn (t;q) come
into play. The proof will be completed for the more complex term vGn (q;q), but note that
the proof is essentially the same for vCn (t;q).
Proceed by induction to show vGn (t;q) = µGnnβGn (q)A(t)1/ε. For n ≤ m, vGn (t;q) = 0 and
βGn (q) = 0, showing the base cases hold. Assume that the induction assumption holds up to
n− 1. Equation (3.1.8), is an ordinary differential equation, so verifying the induction holds
for this equation will prove the induction. We will suppress dependencies for readability.
Take the derivative of the induction assumption to get the left-hand side of (3.1.8) (also
recall A(t) =
∫ T
t
a(s)ds):
v˙Gn = µ
G
nβ
G
n
(
1
ε
)
A(1−ε)/ε(−a)
= −aµGnA(1−ε)/ε
(
1
ε
)
βGn .
Substituting the induction assumption into the right-hand side of (3.1.8) gives
− a (µGn )ε (ε− 1)ε−1εε
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiµ
G
nβ
G
nA
1/ε −
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiµ
G
n−iβ
G
n−iA
1/ε
1−ε
= −aµGnA(1−ε)/ε
(
1
ε
)(
ε− 1
ε
)ε−1M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiβ
G
n −
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
µGn−i
µGn
)
βGn−i
1−ε
= −aµGnA(1−ε)/ε
(
1
ε
)
βGn ,
where the last equality is justified by the definition of βGn (q), equation (3.1.9). Observe that
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the first equality, where A1/ε was factored, indicates why there would be problems if rj 6= 0
for all j. The cost terms rj have no time dependency, so A1/ε could not be factored out. This
cannot be compensated in the equation for βGn (t;q), as this term needs to be independent
of time in order to proceed with our prior analysis.
Thus we have shown that the left-hand and right-hand sides of (3.1.8) are equal for the
induction assumption at n, verifying that the induction assumption
vGn (t;q) = µ
G
n (q)β
G
n (q)A(t)
1/ε
holds for all n. Furthermore, by substituting this equation into (3.1.6) gives
p∗n(t;q) =
ε
ε− 1
(
µGn
)−1M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiv
G
n (t;q)−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiv
G
n−i(t;q)

=
ε
ε− 1
(
µGn
)−1M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiµ
G
n (q)β
G
n (q)A(t)
1/ε −
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiµ
G
n−i(q)β
G
n (q)A(t)
1/ε

= A(t)1/ε
ε
ε− 1
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qiβ
G
n (q)−
M∧(n−m)∑
i=1
qi
(
µGn−i(q)
µGn (q)
)
βGn (q)

= A(t)1/εβGn (t;q)
1/(ε−1),
finishing the proof.
The previous corollaries in this section have established that the closed form expression
for optimal expected revenue remains structurally consistent across different low inventory
properties. It is worth observing that for n ≥ M , both µCn (q) = µGn (q) = µ(q) and the
structure of the recursion equations for βCn (q), βGn (q), and βn(q) is the same. This feature
will play an important role in showing asymptotic results for the new low inventory terms.
We now wish to show that the result from Theorem 2.1.7,
lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε , (3.1.10)
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holds for βCn (q) and βGn (q) as well. Examining the proof of Theorem 2.1.7 reveals two
properties of βn(q) that were necessary: the recursive structure of βn(q) and that βn(q) was
non-decreasing. βCn (q) and βGn (q) both have the proper recursive structure for large enough
n, but numerical calculations show that the non-decreasing property does not always hold
for them. However, we can find upper and lower bounds for βCn (q) and βGn (q) using other
β-like sequences which are non-decreasing and have the limiting behavior of (3.1.10).
The particular β-type sequence we want has base cases of any value (not just 0), and
also these base cases may be for any M successive inventory levels (not just for n = −M + 1
to n = 0). Let N be an integer and let B = (bn)Nn=N−M+1 be a finite sequence of M terms.
Then define the sequence (βn(q, B))∞n=N−M+1 by βn(q;B) = bn for N −M + 1 ≤ n ≤ N (in
other words, B is the base case sequence for βn(q;B)) and such that for n > N , βn(q;B) is
the non-negative solution to
ε− 1
ε
= βn(q;B)
1
ε−1
(
βn(q;B)−
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q;B)
)
. (3.1.11)
Existence and uniqueness of this solution follows from Lemma 2.1.1.
Theorem 3.1.2. For any probability distribution q and finite base case sequence B =
(bn)
N
n=N−M+1, where N is an integer,
lim
n→∞
βn(q;B)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
Proof. First we show the result if the base case sequence B is non-decreasing. Then to
prove for a general B, we find upper and lower bounds using sequences whose base cases are
non-decreasing.
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Suppose B is non-decreasing. Recall Theorem 2.1.7, which stated that
lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε . (3.1.12)
The proof of that theorem relied on two properties of βn(q): the recursion equation for βn(q)
(equation (2.1.5)) and the non-decreasing nature of βn(q) (Theorem 2.1.3). So if it is shown
that βn(q;B) has these two properties, (3.1.12) will also hold with βn(q;B) in place of βn(q).
It is readily seen that the recursion equation for βn(q;B), equation (3.1.11), matches
the structure of the recursion relation for βn(q), equation (2.1.5). To show βn(q;B) is non-
decreasing, recall Theorem 2.1.3, which stated that βn(q) was non-decreasing. The proof
of that theorem used induction and relied on the recursive equation for βn(q) along with
the fact that the base cases of βn(q) also satisfied the induction. Since B, the base case
sequence for βn(q;B), is non-decreasing, the proof of Theorem 2.1.3 also shows βn(q;B) is
non-decreasing. Therefore the limit (3.1.12) holds for βn(q;B):
lim
n→∞
βn(q, B)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε . (3.1.13)
Now consider any finite base case sequence B = (bn)Nn=N−M+1. Define the constant base
case sequences Bmax = (max(B))Nn=N−M+1 and Bmin = (min(B))Nn=N−M+1. These constant
sequences are useful because they are non-decreasing, so by what was shown earlier in the
proof, lim
n→∞
βn(q;Bmin)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε = lim
n→∞
βn(q;Bmax)
n
ε−1
ε
.
We now follow an argument similar to the one for Theorem 2.1.3. Proceed by induction
to show that βn(q;Bmin) ≤ βn(q;B) ≤ βn(q;Bmax) for all n ≥ N−M+1. By definition, the
induction assumption holds for N−M+1 ≤ n ≤ N . Now suppose the induction assumption
holds up to n − 1. The βn(q;B) terms are calculated recursively, so to compute βn(q;B),
the terms βk(q;B) for any k < n are known and treated as constants when solving the
recursion equation (3.1.11) for βn(q;B). Thus computing βn(q;B) is equivalent to solving
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the equation g(x) = ε−1
ε
for x where
g(x) := x
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q, B)x
1
ε−1 .
Similarly, consider the functions f corresponding to βn(q;Bmax) and h corresponding to
βn(q;Bmin),
f(x) := x
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q, Bmax)x
1
ε−1 ,
h(x) := x
ε
ε−1 −
M∑
i=1
qiβn−i(q, Bmin)x
1
ε−1 .
The inequality
f(x) ≤ g(x) ≤ h(x) (3.1.14)
holds by comparing the coefficients of f , g, and h and applying the induction assumption.
That means the solution to f(x) = ε−1
ε
is greater than or equal to the solution for g(x) = ε−1
ε
,
which is greater than or equal to the solution for h(x) = ε−1
ε
. In other words,
βn(q;Bmin) ≤ βn(q;B) ≤ βn(q;Bmax), (3.1.15)
which completes the induction.
Note that the solutions exist and are unique for x ≥ 0 by Lemma 2.1.1. Take inequality
(3.1.15), divide by n
ε−1
ε and take the limit as n→∞ to get
lim
n→∞
βn(q;Bmin)
n
ε−1
ε
≤ lim
n→∞
βn(q;B)
n
ε−1
ε
≤ lim
n→∞
βn(q;Bmax)
n
ε−1
ε
.
Then applying the limit (3.1.13) shows
µ(q)
1−ε
ε ≤ lim
n→∞
βn(q;B)
n
ε−1
ε
≤ µ(q) 1−εε ,
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and equality holds throughout, completing the proof.
Corollary 3.1.3.
lim
n→∞
βGn (q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
lim
n→∞
βCn (q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε ,
Proof. Observe that βGn (q) differs from a typical β-like sequence because for m < n < M its
recursion equation (3.1.9), differs from the typical β-like recursion; however, for n ≥ M the
recursion structure is the same. The idea is to treat the values of βGn (q) for m < n < m+M
from (3.1.9) as the base cases of a new β-like sequence. Then this new β-like sequence and
βGn (q) would actually be one and the same, but the β-like sequence would allow Theorem 3.1.2
to be applied to it.
To show this formally, let B = (βGn (q))m+M−1n=m . Then βGn (q) = βn(q, B) for all n ≥ m and
lim
n→∞
βCn (q)
n
ε−1
ε
= lim
n→∞
βn(q, B)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε ,
completing the proof. A similar argument shows the result for βCn (q) as well.
We have shown two ways to control the minimum inventory level when a customer’s
demand would place the inventory below that level. Either the customer buys as many
items as they can, down to the minimum inventory level, or the customer buys no items. A
particularly useful application of defining the minimum inventory level is trying to determine
the optimal amount of overselling to do, which is an interesting optimization problem with
its own challenges. We also showed how to implement a penalty cost dependent linearly on
the price for selling an item while at a particular inventory level. This allows us to implement
costs which might be incurred while engaging in overselling.
With these adaptations to the model for low inventory, we were able to keep the structure
of our original results by creating analogs of µ(q) and βn(q). The key feature that made
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this work was that these terms matched with the original terms for a large enough inventory
level. These results agree with the intuition that the behavior when the inventory is low
should have little influence on the behavior when inventory is high. It also confirms that
dynamic pricing will be most powerful the smaller the inventory.
3.2 Social Efficiency
For a unit order model with constant demand elasticity, the surprising result that a monop-
olist sets socially efficient prices was shown in (McAfee and te Velde 2008). We find this also
holds for variable order sizes. The mathematical techniques presented are minor adaptations
from the main results, but they are important to show some of the economic connections
with constant demand elasticity.
When thinking about our arrival rate function λ(p, t), it is the compound rate of cus-
tomers who arrive and also are willing to order some number of items at the current
price. Suppose λ(p, t) can be written to highlight both of those factors, that is λ(p, t) =
α(t)(1−F (p)), where α(t) is the arrival rate of customers at time t and 1−F (p) is the prob-
ability that a customer is willing to pay at least p for each item they order. It is reasonable
that α(t) is independent of p, since with no advertising, customers will not know the price
before they arrive.
Let V be the social value of an item to a customer, where V can be thought of as the
maximum price a customer would pay for an item. So when a customer buys an item at
price p, the social value of the item to them is at least p. Then how much is the expected
value of V , given that V ≥ p? Letting f(v) be the probability density function of V , we get
E[V |V ≥ p] =
∫ ∞
p
vf(v)
1− F (p)dv =
∫ ∞
p
α(t)vf(v)
α(t)(1− F (p))dv =
∫ ∞
p
−v dλ
dp
(v, t)
λ(p, t)
dv,
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and under constant demand elasticity where λ(p, t) = a(t)p−ε,
E[V |V ≥ p] =
∫ ∞
p
εv−ε
p−ε
dv =
ε
ε− 1p.
Let Sn(t;q) be the optimal expected total social value of a product when there are n
items for sale at current time 0 ≤ t ≤ T , given constant demand elasticity ε and customer
order distribution q. Then there is a dynamic programming equation similar to (1.3.1),
except when a sale of i items occurs, instead of earning ip revenue, iE[V |V ≥ p] = i ( ε
ε−1
)
p
social value is earned. That is,
Sn(t;q) = sup
p
(1− λ(p, t)δt)Sn(t+ δt;q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling no items
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt
(
iε
ε− 1p+ Sn−i(t+ δt;q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling i items for p each
 .
As we have seen several times now, this yields an HJB equation similar to (1.3.2),
S ′n(t;q) =− sup
p
a(t)p−ε
[
−Sn(t;q) +
M∑
i=1
qi
(
iε
ε− 1p+ Sn−i(t;q)
)]
=− sup
p
a(t)p−ε
[
µ(q)ε
ε− 1 p−
(
Sn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiSn−i(t;q)
)]
The price pE∗ which attains the supremum is
pE∗n (t;q) = µ(q)
−1
(
Sn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiSn−i(t;q)
)
,
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and so the supremum evaluates to
S ′n(t;q) =− a(t)µ(q)ε
(
1
ε− 1
)(
Sn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiSn−i(t;q)
)1−ε
.
=− a(t)
(
µ(q)ε
ε− 1
)ε
(ε− 1)ε−1
εε
(
Sn(t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiSn−i(t;q)
)1−ε
.
We see this equation is now the same as (2.1.4), except with µ(q) replaced by
(
µ(q)ε
ε−1
)ε
.
Therefore Theorem 2.1.2 holds with the same substitution. Hence the optimal revenue
equation (2.1.6) now becomes
Sn(t;q) =
(
µ(q)ε
ε− 1
)ε
βn(q)A(t)1/ε
and the optimal expected price remains unchanged,
pE∗n = βn(q)
−1/(ε−1)A(t)1/ε.
This proves the following result.
Corollary 3.2.1. With constant demand elasticity and variable order sizes, the monopolist
optimal pricing strategy is also the strategy which maximizes social efficiency.
We can draw some parallels between the social efficiency and the low inventory behavior
in the previous section. In both cases, one of the modifications to the dynamic program-
ming equation was what was earned when a sale occurred. The structure of the dynamic
programming equation is such that terms which modify earnings based on price do not influ-
ence the optimal pricing strategy. Rather, just the total expected revenue (or social value)
is influenced. See Corollary 3.1.1).
57
3.3 Advertising and Infinite Time Horizon
This section discusses how to introduce other features into the variable order size dynamic
pricing model. The main adaptations are sale earning modifiers, discounting, and advertising.
Sale earning modifiers include the effect of taxes, subsides, and costs, which influence the
profit earned from one sale. Discounting allows the model to support an infinite time horizon.
Advertising changes the basic problem, since there are now two features which a seller can
control, and so the seller is trying to find a pair of pricing and advertising policies which
optimizes revenue. The work in this section adapts the work of (Helmes and Schlosser 2013)
to include variable order sizes.
Recall the dynamic programming equation (1.3.1),
vn(t;q) = sup
p
(1− λ(p, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling no items
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt(ip+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
From selling i items for p each
 .
As we proceed, we will discuss how new model features influence this equation. First,
consider effects which modify the amount of revenue earned on a sale. Suppose there are
taxes or subsidies, based on the sale price of an item. This introduces a multiplicative factor
f(t) such that a sale at price p earns f(t)p instead of p. Thus the dynamic programming
equation becomes
vn(t;q) = sup
p
[
(1− λ(p, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q)
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, t)δt(if(t)p+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))
]
.
Now consider advertising. Since the dynamic programming equation considers a small
interval of time δt, it makes the most sense to think about a fixed advertising rate w > 0
(later we let w depend on time). Suppose advertising has a tax or subsidy factor k(t). Then
to acheive an effective advertising rate w, a rate of k(t)w needs to be spent. Over the time
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span δt, the total spent on advertising is (δt)k(t)w. This new cost is subtracted from all
terms in the dynamic programming equation, since it is incurred regardless if a sale occurs
or not.
Moreover, advertising makes other fundamental changes. The supremum is now taken
over both price and advertising, since both terms can be controlled. Advertising also affects
the arrival rate of customers; more advertising implies a larger arrival rate. Thus, the arrival
rate λ(p, t) must now be λ(p, w, t) to account for this dependency. With advertising, the
new dynamic programming equation is
vn(t;q) = sup
p>0,w≥0
[
(1− λ(p, w, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q)
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, w, t)δt(if(t)p+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))− (δt)k(t)w
]
.
Finally consider discounting. If r(t) > 0 is the instantaneous time-dependent discount
rate, then over a time period δt there is an accumulated discount rate R(δt) =
∫ δt
0
r(s)ds.
Any future expenditures or earnings are adjusted to their present time value, and it is widely
known in the literature that the appropriate multiplicative factor is e−R(δt). In other words,
every term on the right hand side of the previous equation is multiplied by e−R(δt). Note
that R(t) +R(δt) = R(t+ δt), and so
e−R(t)vn(t;q) = e−R(t+δt) sup
p>0,w≥0
[
(1− λ(p, w, t)δt)vn(t+ δt;q)
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, w, t)δt(if(t)p+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))− (δt)k(t)w
]
.
As seen previously, we work towards developing the HJB equations by rearranging the pre-
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vious equation as
e−R(t+δt)vn(t;q)− e−R(t)vn(t;q)
δt
=− e−R(t+δt) sup
p>0,w≥0
[
−λ(p, w, t)vn(t+ δt;q)
+
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, w, t)(if(t)p+ vn−i(t+ δt;q))− k(t)w
]
.
Take the limit as δt → 0. Observe that the left-hand side of the previous equation is the
limit definition of a derivative, making the left-hand side d
dt
[
e−R(t)vn(t;q)
]
and yields
− r(t)e−R(t)vn(t;q) + e−R(t)v˙n(t;q)
= −e−R(t) sup
p>0,w≥0
[
−λ(p, w, t)vn(t;q) +
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, w, t)(if(t)p+ vn−i(t;q))− k(t)w
]
.
So far we have kept the same notation as Section 2.1 while demonstrating how new features
are added to the model. While working through this section, many terms will be analogs
to terms from the model without advertising. Therefore we will use superscripts “A” to
help distinguish these types of terms in their new context. So in the previous equation we
will write vAn instead of vn. Additionally, dependencies on t and q are generally suppressed,
unless the dependencies improve understanding. With these details in mind, the previous
equation can be rearranged to get the HJB equations while including advertising (recalling
that
∑M
i=1 iqi = µ):
v˙An =rv
A
n − sup
p>0,w≥0
[
−λ(p, w)vAn +
M∑
i=1
qiλ(p, w)(ifp+ v
A
n−i)− kw
]
=rvAn − sup
p>0,w≥0
[
λ(p, w)
(
µfp−
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
))
− kw
]
=rvAn − sup
p>0,w≥0
λ(p, w)µfp
[
1− 1
µfp
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
− kw
λ(p, w)µfp
]
(3.3.1)
Equation (3.3.1) has been developed in generality. Now we assume constant demand
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elasticity and constant advertising elasticity. Under this scenario, λ(p, w, t) = a(t)wδp−ε,
where 0 ≤ δ < 1 is the advertising elasticity. Note how λ depends on wδ is similar to how λ
depends on p−ε. This type of dependency is due to the constant elasticity assumptions for
advertising and price. For more details on how advertising is defined, see (MacDonald and
Rasmussen 2009).
This new arrival rate λ can be thought of as a composite arrival rate. First, a(t)wδ models
the rate of customer arrivals. More advertising expenditure w equates to more arrivals, but
since 0 ≤ δ < 1, there are diminishing returns. Once a customer arrives, p−ε models the
effect price has on turning them into a buyer.
Let w∗n(t;q) and pA∗n (t;q) denote the optimal advertising rate and pricing policy, respec-
tively, at time 0 ≤ t < T and inventory n. To determine w∗n and pA∗n which achieve the
supremum in (3.3.1), one could employ normal maximization techniques by setting the par-
tial derivatives to 0. However, the problem of determining the optimal relationship between
pricing and advertising policies has been known for many years as the Dorfman-Steiner
Identity (from (Dorfman and Steiner 1954)).
The Dorfman-Steiner Identity states that at any moment the relative cost of optimal
advertising w∗n(t;q) compared to optimal revenue pA∗n (t;q)λ(p, w, t)µ(q) is equal to the ratio
of advertising elasticity δ and price elasticity ε. In our case, we actually use the effective
advertising k(t)w∗n(t;q) and the effective revenue f(t)pA∗n (t;q)λ(p, w, t)µ(q), since the terms
k(t) and f(t) indicate a tax or subsidy to their original terms. Therefore we obtain a
Dorfman-Steiner Identity of
k(t)w∗n(t;q)
f(t)pA∗n (t;q)λ(p, w, t)µ(q)
=
δ
ε
. (3.3.2)
If we substitute λ(p, w, t) = a(t) (w∗n)
δ (pA∗n )−ε into this equation, then we can write the
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optimal advertising in terms of optimal price as
w∗n(t;q) =
((
a(t)f(t)µ(q)
k(t)
)(
δ
ε
)(
1
pA∗n (t;q)
)ε−1) 11−δ
. (3.3.3)
This shows that not only are advertising and pricing related to each other, but they are
inversely related since ε > 1. Equation (3.3.3) can now be substituted into the supremum
of (3.3.1), which allows the maximal p to be calculated. To find pA∗n , the derivative with
respect to p of the term in the supremum is taken and set to 0. (This is assumed to be a
maximum since the expected optimal value is finite.)
Now begin optimizing from the supremum of (3.3.1):
0 =
d
dp
[
λ(p, w)µfp
[
1− 1
µfp
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
− kw
λ(p, w)µfp
]]
=
d
dp
[
awδp−εµfp
[
1− 1
µfp
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
− δ
ε
]]
=
d
dp
((afµ
k
)(
δ
ε
)(
1
p
)ε−1) δ1−δ
p1−ε
[(
ε− δ
ε
)
− 1
µfp
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)]
=
d
dp
[
p
1−ε
1−δ
(
ε− δ
ε
)
− p− ε−δ1−δ
(
1
µf
)(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)]
=
(
1− ε
1− δ
)
p
1−ε
1−δ−1
(
ε− δ
ε
)
+
(
ε− δ
1− δ
)
p−
ε−δ
1−δ−1
(
1
µf
)(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
=
(
1− ε
ε
)
p+
(
1
µf
)(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
,
and from this computation we find the price which obtains the supremum in (3.3.3) is
pA∗n (t;q) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
1
f(t)µ(q)
)(
vAn (t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i(t;q)
)
. (3.3.4)
At first glance it seems that this price does not depend on advertising w or advertising
elasticity δ; however, vAn (t;q) has dependency on δ, so price does in fact depend on the
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advertising.
Before proceeding a few terms will be defined in order to greatly simplify future calcula-
tions:
γ :=
ε− δ
1− δ
η :=
(
δ
ε
) δ
1−δ
(
ε− δ
ε
)γ
,
g(t) :=
(
a(t)f(t)ε
k(t)δ
) 1
1−δ
,
ζ(t) := g(t)
(
η
γ
)(
γ − 1
γ
)γ−1
. (3.3.5)
One useful relation of the first term is 1 − γ = 1−ε
1−δ . Note that γ is chosen to match the
notation of (Helmes and Schlosser 2013), but is unrelated to the γn used in Section 2.1. γ
can be thought of as a joint elasticity that relates the elasticities δ and ε. The other three
terms do not have particular interpretations, but will come up in future computations.
Begin with v˙An from (3.3.1), with the optimal pricing and advertising strategies to elimi-
nate the supremum,
v˙An =rv
A
n − λ(pA∗n , w∗n)µfpA∗n
[
1− 1
µfpA∗n
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)
− kw
∗
n
λ(pA∗n , w∗n)µfpA∗n
]
.
Simplify the bracketed term using (3.3.4) and (3.3.2) to get
v˙An =rv
A
n − λ(pA∗n , w∗n)µfpA∗n
[
1− ε− 1
ε
− δ
ε
]
=rvAn − a
((
afµ
k
)(
δ
ε
)(
1
pA∗n
)ε−1) δ1−δ (
pA∗n
)−ε
µfpA∗n
(
1− δ
ε
)
=rvAn − (aµf)
1
1−δ
(
δ
kε
) δ
1−δ (
pA∗n
) 1−ε
1−δ
(
1− δ
ε
)
=rvAn − (aµf)
1
1−δ
(
δ
kε
) δ
1−δ
((
ε
ε− 1
)(
1
fµ
)(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)) 1−ε
1−δ (
1− δ
ε
)
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=rvAn − µ
ε
1−δ
[
a
1
1−δ f
ε
1−δ
(
δ
kε
) δ
1−δ
(
1− δ
ε
)(
ε
ε− 1
)1−γ](
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)1−γ
=rvAn − µ
ε
1−δ · ζ ·
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)1−γ
. (3.3.6)
The last equality is justified by the following work starting with the definition for ζ, equation
(3.3.5):
ζ =
(
af ε
kδ
) 1
1−δ
(
δ
ε
) δ
1−δ
(
ε−δ
ε
)γ
γ
(
γ − 1
γ
)γ−1
=
(
af ε
kδ
) 1
1−δ
(
δ
ε
) δ
1−δ
(
ε− δ
ε
)γ (
ε− δ
1− δ
)−1(
ε− 1
ε− δ
)γ−1
=
(
af ε
kδ
) 1
1−δ
(
δ
ε
) δ
1−δ
(
1
ε
)γ
(1− δ) (ε− 1)γ−1
= a
1
1−δ f
ε
1−δ
(
δ
kε
) δ
1−δ
(
1− δ
ε
)(
ε− 1
ε
)γ−1
.
The next theorem will give the optimal expected revenue and pricing strategy while
considering advertising and variable order sizes. It was obtained by synthesizing the result
from Theorem 2.1.2 and the work in (Helmes and Schlosser 2013). The proofs themselves are
largely about multiplying the terms out and verifying that they achieve the desired results.
The more important observation is that the idea to find a solution is the same as the solution
for variable order sizes without advertising: separate the solution by a term dependent on
n, a term dependent on t, and a term dependent on the average order size.
A few analogs to definitions from Section 2.1 are needed. First define
AAd(t) := eγR(t)
∫ T
t
e−γR(s)g(s)ds.
Next define the sequence (βAn (q))n by βAn (q) = 0 for n ≤ 0, and for n > 0, βAn (q) satisfies
(
γ − 1
γ
)γ−1
= βAn
(
βAn −
M∑
i=1
qiβ
A
n−i
)γ−1
. (3.3.7)
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The uniqueness and existence follows from Lemma 2.1.1.
Theorem 3.3.1. Assume a model with constant demand elasticity ε, advertising elasticity
δ, and variable order sizes. For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and n, the following holds:
vAn (t; q) = µ(q)
ε
ε−δβAn (q)
(
ηAAd(t)
) 1
γ . (3.3.8)
pA∗n (t; q) =
(
δµ(q)
ε
) δ
ε−δ
(
1
f(t)
)(
βAn
) −1
γ−1
(
AAd(t)
) 1
γ (3.3.9)
w∗n(t; q) =
(
δµ(q)
ε
) ε
ε−δ
(
g(t)
k(t)
)
βAn
(
AAd(t)
) 1−γ
γ (3.3.10)
Proof. Proceed by induction to prove (3.3.8). For n ≤ 0, vAn (t;q) = 0 and βAn (t;q) = 0,
which verifies the base cases. Suppose (3.3.8) holds through n − 1. We verify that the
induction holds in the differential equation (3.3.6) in order to prove the induction. Recall
R(t) =
∫ t
0
r(s)ds. Also let θ = µ
ε
ε−δ to make computations more understandable.
Then the left-hand side (LHS) of (3.3.6) is
LHS = v˙An
=
θβAn η
1
γ
γ
(
AAd(t)
) 1
γ
−1
A˙A(t)
=
θη
1
γ βAn
γ
(
AAd(t)
) 1−γ
γ
(
eγR(t)γr(t)
∫ T
t
e−γR(s)g(s)ds+ eγR(t)(−e−γR(t)g(t))
)
=
θη
1
γ βAn
γ
(
AAd(t)
) 1−γ
γ
(
γr(t)AAd(t)− g(t))
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The right-hand side (RHS) of (3.3.6) is
RHS = rvAn − µ
ε
1−δ · ζ ·
(
vAn −
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i
)1−γ
= rθ
(
ηAAd
) 1
γ βAn − µ
ε
1−δ g
(
η
γ
)(
γ − 1
γ
)γ−1(
θ
(
ηAAd
) 1
γ βAn −
M∑
i=1
qiθ
(
ηAAd
) 1
γ βAn−i
)1−γ
= rθ
(
ηAAd
) 1
γ βAn − µ
ε
1−δ g
(
η
γ
)
η
1−γ
γ θ1−γ
(
AAd
) 1−γ
γ
(
γ − 1
γ
)γ−1(
βAn −
M∑
i=1
qiβ
A
n−i
)1−γ
= rθ
(
ηAAd
) 1
γ βAn − µ
ε
1−δ g
(
1
γ
)
η
1
γ θ1−γ
(
AAd
) 1−γ
γ βAn
=
θη
1
γ βAn
γ
(
AAd
) 1−γ
γ
(
γrAAd − µ ε1−δ θ−γg
)
=
θη
1
γ βAn
γ
(
AAd
) 1−γ
γ
(
γrAAd − g) .
Where the last equality is justified by
µ
ε
1−δ θ−γ = µ
ε
1−δ
(
µ
ε
ε−δ
)− ε−δ
1−δ
= µ
ε
1−δµ
−ε
1−δ = 1.
Therefore the LHS and RHS are equal, proving the induction. Now find the optimal pricing
policy by substituting (3.3.8) into (3.3.4):
pA∗n (t;q) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
1
f(t)µ(q)
)(
vAn (t;q)−
M∑
i=1
qiv
A
n−i(t;q)
)
=
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
1
f(t)µ(q)
)(
µ
ε
ε−δβAn (q)
(
ηAAd(t)
) 1
γ −
M∑
i=1
qiµ
ε
ε−δβAn−i(q)
(
ηAAd(t)
) 1
γ
)
=
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
µ(q)
δ
ε−δ
f(t)
)(
ηAAd(t)
) 1
γ
(
βAn (q)−
M∑
i=1
qiβ
A
n−i(q)
)
=
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
µ(q)
δ
ε−δ
f(t)
)(
ηAAd(t)
) 1
γ
(
γ − 1
γ
)(
βAn
) −1
γ−1
=
(
δµ(q)
ε
) δ
ε−δ
(
1
f(t)
)(
AAd(t)
) 1
γ
(
βAn
) −1
γ−1 .
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To get the optimal advertising, substitute the previous result into (3.3.3):
w∗n(t;q) =
((
a(t)f(t)µ(q)
k(t)
)(
δ
ε
)(
1
pA∗n (t;q)
)ε−1) 11−δ
.
=
(a(t)f(t)µ(q)
k(t)
)(
δ
ε
)((
δµ(q)
ε
) δ
ε−δ
(
1
f(t)
)(
AAd(t)
) 1
γ
(
βAn
) −1
γ−1
)1−ε 11−δ
=
((
a(t)f(t)ε
k(t)
)(
δµ(q)
ε
) ε(1−δ)
ε−δ (
AAd(t)
) 1−ε
γ
(
βAn
) ε−1
γ−1
) 1
1−δ
=
(
δµ(q)
ε
) ε
ε−δ
(
g(t)
k(t)
)(
AAd(t)
) 1−γ
γ βAn
Verifying the last equality is a matter of multiplying out the exponents.
Note that this Theorem is consistent with Theorem 2.1.2 when the various factors are
defined to align with the no advertising model: δ = 0, f(t) = 0, and k(t) = 0. We also
observe that βAn (q) has the same structure as βn(q) (compare (3.3.7) and (2.1.5)), except ε
is replaced with γ. Since γ > 1 also, this means that Theorem 2.1.7 holds for βAn (q), with γ
in place of ε. In other words,
lim
n→∞
βAn (q)
n
γ−1
γ
= µ(q)
1−γ
γ . (3.3.11)
Surprisingly, the average order size plays a role in the optimal pricing and optimal ad-
vertising strategies; whereas, it was not seen in the formulas without advertising. That said,
the next corollary shows that comparable models still have the same asymptotic behavior as
n→∞.
Corollary 3.3.2. (of Theorem 2.2.1) Let M Aq,λ and M Aq¯,λ¯ be comparable models under con-
stant demand elasticity ε and advertising elasticity δ. Then,
lim
n→∞
vAn (t; q, λ)
vAn (t; q¯, λ¯)
= 1, lim
n→∞
pA∗n (t; q, λ)
pA∗n (t; q¯, λ¯)
= 1, lim
n→∞
w∗n(t; q, λ)
w∗n(t; q¯, λ¯)
= 1.
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In other words, M Aq,λ and M Aq¯,λ¯ have asymptotically equivalent optimal expected revenues,
optimal pricing strategies, and optimal advertising strategies. and pricing strategies.
Proof. The proof will follow the original proof of Theorem 2.2.1, just with notation adjusted
for the advertising models being worked with. Let M Aq,λ and M Aq¯,λ¯ be comparable models
with λ(p, t) = a(t)wδp−ε and λ¯(p, t) = a¯(t)w−δp−ε. Let
AAd(t; a) := eγR(t)
∫ T
t
e−γR(s)
(
a(s)f(s)ε
k(s)δ
) 1
1−δ
ds.
Then Theorem 3.3.1 says
vAn (t;q, λ) = µ(q)
ε
ε−δβAn (q)
(
ηAAd(t; a)
) 1
γ . (3.3.12)
Also recall (3.3.11): lim
n→∞
βn(q)
n
ε−1
ε
= µ(q)
1−ε
ε .
Let δ > 0. By combining (3.3.12) with (3.3.11) we see that there exists an N > 0 such
that for all n > N ,
∣∣∣∣∣vAn (t;q, λ)− µ(q) εε−δ
(
n
µ(q)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a)
) 1
γ
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ,∣∣∣∣∣vAn (t; q¯, λ¯)− µ(q¯) εε−δ
(
n
µ(q¯)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a¯)
) 1
γ
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ.
Note that for a constant c, AAd(t; ca) = eγR(t)
∫ T
t
e−γR(s)
(
ca(s)f(s)ε
k(s)δ
) 1
1−δ
ds = c
1
1−δAAd(t; a).
The fact that the constant c is raised to the 1
1−δ power is the main difference between this
proof with advertising and the original proof. However, the next computation will show that
this does not create any problems. First recall the condition for comparable models (2.2.1),
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which gives a(t) = a¯(t)µ(q¯)
µ(q) . Thus
µ(q)
ε
ε−δ
(
n
µ(q)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a)
) 1
γ = µ(q)
ε
ε−δ
(
n
µ(q)
) γ−1
γ
(
ηA
(
t;
a¯µ(q¯)
µ(q)
)) 1−δ
ε−δ
= µ(q)
ε
ε−δ
(
n
µ(q)
) ε−1
ε−δ
(
µ(q¯)
µ(q)
) 1
ε−δ
(ηA (t; a¯))
1−δ
ε−δ
= µ(q¯)
ε
ε−δ
(
n
µ(q¯)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a¯)
) 1
γ .
Then for n > N ,
∣∣vAn (t;q, λ)− vAn (t; q¯, λ¯)∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣vAn (t;q, λ)− µ(q) εε−δ
(
n
µ(q)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a)
) 1
γ
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣µ(q¯) εε−δ
(
n
µ(q¯)
) γ−1
γ (
ηAAd(t; a¯)
) 1
γ − vAn (t; q¯, λ¯)
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2δ.
Since δ was arbitrary, this proves that two comparable models have asymptotically equiv-
alent optimal expected revenues as n→∞. By similar arguments, the optimal pricing strate-
gies and optimal advertising strategies are also asymptotically equivalent as n→∞.
We have shown how variable order sizes change the advertising and discounting model.
The structure of the formulas are the same, but with variable order sizes the average order
size µ(q) now plays a role. There are many more topics in (Helmes and Schlosser 2013),
including economic insights and infinite horizon results. These results are largely unaffected
by variable order sizes, so we do not include a discussion of them. With this, we conclude
the section.
69
3.4 Other Arrival Rate Functions
Using constant demand elasticity has allowed us to get analytic solutions for our model. This,
in turn, has allowed us to get a good understand of how variable order sizes changes the
structure of an optimal pricing problem and what considerations must be taken. Constant
demand elasticity is a useful economic model for a specific type of arrival rate λ, but it would
also be useful to understand how models with different arrival rate structures are affected
with variable order sizes.
This section aims to explore some similarities and differences between problems with
different arrival rates λ. In particular, we examine how the comparison results of Section
2.2 change in the context of different λ. Two special cases of λ will be considered: when λ
is exponential and when it is linear. A couple notes on the graphs. First, the graphs are
technically discrete plots, but are presented with connected lines for readability. Second, the
legends indicate the order size distributions q used for that line.
We begin with the general HJB equations (1.3.2), which were developed independently
of λ(p, t):
v′n(t;q, λ) = − sup
p
λ(p, t)
[
−vn(t;q) +
M∑
i=1
qi(ip+ vn−i(t;q))
]
.
For “nice” λ(p, t), one can find the p∗ which attains the supremum using normal maximization
techniques; however, that p∗ will be defined using vn terms. This means some other technique
to determine the optimal expected revenue is needed. For constant demand elasticity, the
key property was that the optimal expected revenue solution was separable in n and t. This
may not be the case in general.
For a general customer arrival rate function λ(p, t), let vn(t;λ) denote the optimal ex-
pected revenue and p∗n(t;λ) denote the optimal pricing strategy. Exponential arrival rates
are given of the form λ(p, t) = a(t)e−αp, where a(t) > 0 is the same type of arrival rate
scaling factor as seen before, and α > 0 is another scaling factor. When α = 1, (Gallego and
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van Ryzin 1994) found analytic solutions to the optimal revenue and pricing strategies:
vn(t; ae
−p) = log
(
n∑
i=0
(a(t)t/e)i
i!
)
(3.4.1)
p∗n(t; ae
−p) = vn(t; ae−p)− vn−1(t; ae−p) + 1. (3.4.2)
Notably, the optimal expected revenue is not separable in n and t. As such, generalizing this
result to include variable order sizes has been challenging.
While using a max order size of M = 2, we obtained analytic solutions for the optimal
expected revenue for n = 1, 2, 3. For n > 3 the problem became unwieldy as a hypergeometric
function appears as a term in v3, which then becomes difficult to use for n = 4 since solutions
are solved via recursion. but there are challenges.
Compared to constant demand elasticity, there are some fundamental differences when
using exponential arrivals. By looking at (3.4.2) we see that for exponential arrivals, there
is actually a minimum price of 1 (since vn ≥ vn−1); whereas for constant demand elasticity,
there is no minimum price. This is likely related to the related λ functions. For constant
demand elasticity λ(p, t) = p−ε, which is unbounded as p→ 0. When λ(p, t) = e−p, λ→ 1 as
p→ 0. Thus it makes sense that for exponential arrivals the price has a minimum threshold.
Despite a lack of analytic results, we have created a Mathematica program to compute
the numerically optimal expected revenue and pricing strategies. see the appendix for the
code. The program implements the dynamic programming equation (1.3.1), and allows for
a user defined λ(p, t) to be used. Of course, we have a continuous problem and the program
must be implemented on a discrete time scale by picking a value for δt. The presented graphs
use δt = 0.1, which is about 2% of the total time scale. Little accuracy seemed to be gained
by using a finer time scale.
Figure 3.1 shows the optimal expected revenue for exponential arrivals given different
comparable models. They all converge as n increases, but not quite how we may have
expected. Not only do the terms converge to each other, they converge to a specific value.
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This makes sense considering that e−p is bounded. Without a larger time scale there is an
upper limit to the amount of inventory which can be sold on average.
Note also that some of the graphs look like step functions. This is due to the overselling
assumption that we have made when the dynamic programming equation was initially de-
fined. If all the orders are of only one size, say 4, then the expected revenue won’t change
between inventory sizes 1 through 4. In each case, just 4 items are sold. This idea extends
for larger inventory too (if there are 5 through 8 items, 8 items are still sold in 2 batches of
4).
Figure 3.1: Expected revenue with λ(p, t) = 2e−2p, T = 5
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Figure 3.2: Relative difference between a variable order model compared to unit order model.
Solid: λ(p, t) = 2e−2p, T = 5; Dashed: λ(p, t) = 5e−2p.
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Next, Figure 3.2 shows the relative difference between the unit order model and a com-
parable variable order size model for q = (0, 1) at different demand magnitudes. Recall
Theorem 2.2.2 which stated that for constant demand elasticity, this relative difference of
comparable models was independent of the demand magnitude. However, this is not the
case for exponential arrivals. Why might this be? Looking back to Theorem 2.2.2, the proof
of this theorem relied on the fact that vn was separable in n and t. For exponential arrivals,
(3.4.1) indicates that the solution for vn is not separable in n and t.
Figure 3.3: Expected value with λ(p, t) = 2(2− p)
5 10 15 20 25
2
4
6
8
10
n
Ex
pe
ct
ed
re
ve
nu
e (1)(0, 1)(0.2, 0.3, 0.5)(0, 0, 0, 1)
Another specific λ explored in the literature is linear arrival rates. That is, λ(p, t) =
a(t)(α − p), where a(t) is an arrival rate scaling factor and a(t)α is the maximum arrivals
when p = 0. Again we see that arrivals are bounded, so we expect optimal expected revenue
to be bounded as well. Using the numerical computations again we plot the numerical
optimal expected revenue in Figure 3.3. Indeed the graph matches our intuition that there
is an upper bound on vn. Similar to exponential arrivals, Figure 3.4 shows that the relative
difference between comparable models is not independent of the demand magnitude.
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Figure 3.4: Relative difference between a variable order model compared to unit order model.
Solid: λ(p, t) = 2(2− p), T = 5; Dashed: λ(p, t) = 5(2− p) , T = 5.
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The numerical computations in this section reveal some important insights. First is
that the comparable models, regardless of the λ chosen, appear to have the same asymptotic
behavior in the inventory size. It is pleasing that the numerical calculations support this idea,
as it is one which makes intuitive sense. We conjecture that the result holds for general λ.
We have also seen that the relative difference between comparable models is not independent
of the demand magnitude for general λ, showing that constant demand elasticity is a special
case. We have also presented useful code which can be utilized to explore more questions
about how variable order sizes influences dynamic pricing.
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4.
Conclusion
We have explored the problem of how variable order sizes influence the optimal pricing
strategies for a model with constant demand elasticity. We obtained analytic results for the
optimal revenue and pricing strategies and found that the average order size was important,
a term not seen in the unit order case. Comparisons between models with the same demand
were also examined, and we showed that comparable models have the same asymptotic
pricing behavior in the inventory size.
In a practical sense, the comparison results give the insight that a variable order size
model may be approximated with a unit order size model. Numerical results indicated that
comparable models converge relatively quickly. This amounts to extra modeling flexibility,
since unit order models are easier to work with. Moreover, the relative difference between the
optimal expected revenue and pricing strategy for two comparable models is not dependent
on the scale of demand.
Variable order size models require the problem of low inventory to be addressed, due to the
structure of the dynamic programming equation which is developed. Of particular interest
was defining different behavior at low inventory. We showed two ways of approaching the
problem of what to do when there is not enough inventory let to meet a customers demand:
turn them away or sell them all remaining inventory.
This was further extended to allow the minimum inventory to be any value, where nega-
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tive inventory indicated overselling inventory (such as overbooking tickets on a flight). Costs
based on the price of an item were also introduced in order to account for risks associated
with overselling. Even with the low inventory features, our asymptotic and comparison
results still held.
From an economic standpoint, constant demand elasticity is interesting because the mo-
nopolist pricing strategy is also socially efficient. We also discussed how to introduce ad-
vertising and discounting into the variable order size model. These were two very different
features that greatly improved the generality of the model.
There is still more to be explored related to variable order size models. While variable
order sizes are not new to the literature, they are often treated in terms of numerical calcula-
tions. This is fine from a practical application of the theory, but as shown in this dissertation
there are also useful analytic insights. Given the importance of comparable models, and the
comparison results, we also think examining in more detail the converge rate of comparable
models would also be an interesting topic. Other arrival rate functions were briefly explored,
and more work could be done to analyze these models as well.
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5.
Appendix
Figure 5.1: Mathematica code which implements basic definitions from the paper.
(*beta[n_,ep_,qvec_] creates the beta function as defined in the paper. Make sure to run before using any beta terms!
returns: nothing;
n := the index of beta;
ep := the demand elasticity;
qvec := the order size distribution, given as list {q1,...,qM};*)
defineBetas[n_, ep_, qvec_] :=
ModuleRHS = ep - 1.
ep
ep-1.
, i, lengthq, current = 0., prev, q = qvec, j,
If[Total[q] ≠ 1.0, q = Input["q sum error"]];
If[ValueQ[beta[n, ep, qvec]], Return["Already Done!"]];
lengthq = Length[q];
prev = ConstantArray[0., lengthq];
Fori = 1, i ≤ n, i++,
current = NSolvex (x - Sum[q[[j]] prev[[j]], {j, 1, lengthq}])ep-1. ⩵ RHS && x ≥ 0, x[[1, 1, 2]];
beta[i, ep, q] = current;
For[j = lengthq, j > 1, j--,
prev[[j]] = prev[[j - 1]];];
prev[[1]] = current;;;
(*Helpful functions*)(*mu[...] is the Average order size of a probability distribution*)
mu[qlist_] := Sum[i* qlist[[i]], {i, 1, Length[qlist]}];(*A[...] as defined in the paper*)
A[t_, T_, a_] := Integrate[a, {s, t, T}];(*V[...] is the optimal expected revenue for a constant elasticity model, with inputs matching those from the paper*)
V[n_, t_, T_, a_, ep_, q_] := mu[q] beta[n, ep, q] A[t, T, a]^(1/ ep);(*PStarCE[...] is the optimal pricing policy for a constant elasticity model, with inputs matching those from the paper*)
PStarCE[n_, t_, T_, a_, ep_, q_] := beta[n, ep, q]^(-1/(ep - 1)) A[t, T, a]^(1/ ep);
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Figure 5.2: Mathematica code which implements a Poisson model to simulate the revenue
earned while using the optimal pricing strategy.
(*randomOrderSize[q_]
returns: a random order size using probability distribution q;
q := a probability distribution given as a list {q1,...,qM}*)
randomOrderSize[q_] := Module[{pick = RandomReal[], count = q[[1]], i},
For[i = 1, i ≤ Length[q], i++,
If[pick <= count, Return[i], count += q[[i + 1]]]]];
(*runPricingSimulation[parameters_] simulates the Poisson random arrival of customers under constant demand elasticity. The
optimal pricing policy PStarCE[...] is used to control the arrival rate of customers Make sure beta is defined before running;
returns: the revenue earned during the simulation;
parameters := a list of parameters for the simulation, see the module variables for each term;*)
runPricingSimulation[parameters_] := Module[{inventory = parameters[[1]],
T = parameters[[2]],
a = parameters[[3]],
ep = parameters[[4]],
dt = parameters[[5]],
q = parameters[[6]],
revenue = 0,
prices = {},
jumpTimes = {},
precision = 7,
t, successRate, jumpSize = 0},
For[t = 0, t < T, t += dt,
If[inventory > 0,
AppendTo[prices, {t, PStarCE[inventory, t, T, a, ep, q]}];
successRate = LambdaCE[prices[[-1, -1]], a, ep]* dt;
If[RandomReal[WorkingPrecision → precision] < successRate,
AppendTo[jumpTimes, t];
jumpSize = randomOrderSize[q];
inventory -= jumpSize;
revenue += jumpSize* prices[[-1, -1]]],(*Else, if all sold*)
AppendTo[prices, {t, 0}];]];
revenue];
(*runManyPricingSimulations[parameterSets_] sequentially runs Poisson pricing simulations,
allowing results for several different parameter sets to be run, as well as several trials per parameter set;
returns: a list containing elements of the form {{parameter list}, {list of revenue earned}};
parameterSets := a list where each element is a list of parameters. See runPricingSimulation for how to format parameters;
trials := how many trials to run for each parameter set;*)
runManyPricingSimulations[parameterSets_, trials_] := Module[{
masterResults = {},
i = 0,
j = 0,
trialResults},
Print["Trial progress:"];
Print[ProgressIndicator[Dynamic[i/ trials]]];
Print["Parameter progress:"];
Print[ProgressIndicator[Dynamic[j/ Length[parameterSets]]]];
For[j = 1, j ≤ Length[parameterSets], j++,
trialResults = {};
For[i = 1, i ≤ trials, i++,
AppendTo[trialResults, runPricingSimulation[parameterSets[[j]]]];];
AppendTo[masterResults, {parameterSets[[j]], trialResults}];];
masterResults];
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Figure 5.3: Mathematica code which implements an algorithm to numerically calculate the
optimal expected revenue and pricing strategy for any arrival rate function.
(*The following functions define different types of customer arrival functions. Used for optimalRevenueNumeric[...];
params := a list which corresponds to different scaling factors of that particular function*)
LambdaExp[p_, params_] := params[[1]]* Exp[-params[[2]]* p];
LambdaCE[p_, params_] := params[[1]] p^(-params[[2]]);
LambdaLinear[p_, params_] := params[[1]] (params[[2]] - p);
(*optimalRevenueNumeric[n_,T_,q_,Lambda_,lambdaParams_,dt_] is an algorithm which uses the HJB equations to numerically
calculate and define the optimal expected revenue JStarN[...] and pricing strategy PStarN[...] functions for all inventory levels n,
and discrete time values 0≤t≤T with steps dt. IMPORTANT! The functions which are generated are evaluated at integer time steps,
not at specific times. To calculate the time step you must use IntegerPart[t/dt] (This avoids floating point number issues.);
returns: nothing;
n := the maximum inventory;
T := the maximum time;
q := order size distribution given as a list {q1,...,qM};
lambda := the name of the function which defines the arrival rate;
lambdaParams := the parameters for the chosen lambda function;
dt := the size of timesteps for the numeric calculations*)
optimalRevenueNumeric[n_, T_, q_, Lambda_, lambdaParams_, dt_] := Module[{inv = 0, time, timeSteps = 1, result, M = Length[q]},(*Display Computation progress*)
Print["Inventory progress"];
Print[ProgressIndicator[Dynamic[inv/ n]]];
Print["Time progress"];
Print[ProgressIndicator[Dynamic[time / T]]];
(*Declare initial values*)
JStarN[0, anyt_, anyq_, anyLambda_, anylambdaParams_, anydt_] := 0; (*No inventory*)
JStarN[anyn_, 0, anyq_, anyLambda_, anylambdaParams_, anydt_] := 0; (*No Time*)
(*Use dynamic programming to calculate values*)
For[inv = 1, inv ≤ n, inv++,
timeSteps = 0;
For[time = dt, time ≤ T, time += dt,
timeSteps += 1; (*Integer timesteps are used to avoid numerical imprecision of defining PStarN and JStarN at discrete decimal t values*)
result =
NMaximize[{Lambda[p, lambdaParams]* dt* Sum[q[[k]] (k* p + JStarN[Max[0, inv - k], timeSteps - 1, q, Lambda, lambdaParams, dt]), {k, 1, M}] +(1 - Lambda[p, lambdaParams]* dt) JStarN[inv, timeSteps - 1, q, Lambda, lambdaParams, dt],
p ≥ 0, 0 <= Lambda[p, lambdaParams]* dt ≤ 1}, (*Constraints*)
p, MaxIterations → 250];
PStarN[inv, timeSteps, q, Lambda, lambdaParams, dt] = result[[2, 1, 2]];
JStarN[inv, timeSteps, q, Lambda, lambdaParams, dt] = result[[1]];]]]
(*constDemand[dem_,q_];
returns: the arrival rate scaling factor a which makes a*mu[q]=dem;
dem := the target demand value;
q := desired order size distribution;*)
constDemand[dem_, q_] := If[Total[q] ⩵ 1., dem/ mu[q], Print["Faulty q"]];
(*runManyOptimalRevenueNumeric[...] will run sequential computations to find the optimal revenue and optimal pricing strategy
for several comparable models, only the order size distributions must be provided;
returns: nothing;
n := max inventory;
T := max time;
qList := a list of order size distributions, {{dist 1}, {dist 2},...{last dist}};
Lambda := the arrival rate function;
demMag := the demand magnitude all the models should have;
alpha := *)
findRevenueForComparableModels[n_, T_, qList_, Lambda_, demMag_, alpha_, dt_] := Module[{i},
For[i = 1, i ≤ Length[qList], i++,
optimalRevenueNumeric[n, T, qList[[i]], Lambda, {constDemand[demMag, qList[[i]]], alpha}, dt];]]
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• Led games with authority and quick decision making
Published Works
"Spatial Structures in a Simple Model of Population Dynamics for June 2015
Parasite-Host Interactions" (Article)
Europhysics Letters, v111 (2015)
• Used C++ to create simulations and utilized them for numerical data analysis
Awards
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Milwaukee, WI
• Levine Science Fellowship Spring 2018
• Ernst Schwandt Teaching Award Spring 2018
• Research Excellence Award 2017 - 2018
• Chancellor's Graduate Student Award 2013 - 2014, 2016 - 2017
• GAANN Fellowship Sum 2015 - Sum 2016
Hamline University - St. Paul, MN
• Fulford-Karp Physics Scholarship 2008 - 2012
• Presidential Scholarship 2008 - 2012
• Lindgren Mathematics Scholarship 2010 - 2012
• Hoel Scholarship 2011 - 2012
• Carl Malmstrom Research Scholarship Summer 2010
• First Year in Mathematics Award 2008 - 2009
Presentations
"Dyanmic Pricing with Variable Order Sizes for a Model with Constant Demand Elasticity" June 2018
A Symposium on Optimal Stopping - Houston, TX
exponential and logarithmic functions, rational exponents, systems of linear equations.
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• Invited speaker
"Dyanmic Pricing with Multiple Order Sizes" July 2017
SIAM Conference on Control and Applications - Pittsburgh, PA
• Info
"Exploring a Parasite-Host Model with Monte Carlo Simulations" April 2011
National Conference of Undergraduate Research (NCUR) - Ithaca, NY
• Included results, methods, and theory of parasite-host research from Sum 2010
"Exploring a Parasite-Host Model with Monte Carlo Simulations" March 2011
American Physical Society (APS) March meeting - Dallas, TX
• Recognized by Society of Physics Students (SPS) for outstanding presentation
Leadership
Game Design and Development (President) April 2014 - Dec 2017
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Milwaukee WI Joined Nov 2012
• Work with others to hone game development skills.
• Lead discussions about game design theory and implementation.
Theta Chi Fraternity (President & Treasurer) Dec 2009 - Nov 2011
Beta Kappa Chapter at Hamline University - St. Paul, MN Nov 2008 - May 2012
• Provided vision for chapter and served as point of contact for alumni and administration.
• Improved financial accountability within chapter.
• Chaired committee responsible for financial decisions of the chapter and management of the chapter's house.
Hamline University Swing Dancers (Treasurer) Feb 2009 - Feb 2010
Hamline University - St. Paul, MN Nov 2008 - May 2012
• Integral to budgeting and planning of PR events
New Student Mentor Feb 2009 - Feb 2010
Hamline University - St. Paul, MN
• Served as role model and resource to incoming students
• Developed leadership skills while assisting Freshman orientation
Skills
Global Game Jam (Project manager, programmer, and game designer) Jan 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
French (5 years taken)
Programming: C++, Python, Lisp
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